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II 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARKPLASKON : 
Plaintiff Appellant. 
Vs. 
: Case No. 20000066-CA 
CRAIG DEARDANet all 
Defendant/Appelle 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a direct appeal from a decision by Judge Tyrone E. Medley of the Third 
Judicial District Court granting Defendants Motion to Dismiss. Jurisdiction is conferred 
upon this court pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j)UCA(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs complaint pursuant 
to an analysis of Retherford vs. AT&T Communications 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992). As the 
case turns on an interpretation of law this Court must review the Lower Courts decision for 
correctness. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision by Judge Tyrone E. Medley dismissing the 
Plaintiffs claims with prejudice. The plaintiff originally brought this action in 1998 against 
the defendants alleging various causes of action that arose during the period of his 
employment as a documents examiner for the Utah State Department of Public Safety Crime 
Laboratory from December 1985 until August 1986 when he was terminated. 
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Plaintiffs complaint particularly focused on the period subsequent to his termination 
that documents contained in his personnel file were inaccurate and defamatory and alleged 
and were shown to or discussed with potential employers and these false and deliberately 
misleading and incomplete statements constituted a continuing effort on the part of the 
defendants to prevent plaintiff from working in his chosen career. 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss in February of 1999. Plaintiff responded to 
Defendants motion and Oral Argument was held thereon on October 18, 1999. In the Oral 
argument Judge Medley requested that both parties brief the case of Deborah S. Retherford 
vs. AT&T Communications 844 P. 2d 949,(UT 1992) which the court believed may be 
depositive of the issues. Both parties filed supplemental Memoranda and on December 20, 
1999 the Court entered its decision dismissing the plaintiffs case with prejudice. The 
plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on January 18, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(With respect to citations to the record there was no testimony taken and therefore no 
citation to a transcript will be made. The following facts are taken from plaintiffs complaint, 
the defendants Memorandum in support of Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiffs response to 
Defendants Motion to Dismiss which documents are on file as part of the record herein.) 
This case involved an employment action. The Defendant State of Utah was 
Plaintiffs former employer. Plaintiff was hired in 1985 by the State of Utah as a 
Questioned Documents Examiner to work in the crime laboratory of the Department of 
Public Safety. He was hired as a six month probationer. His immediate supervisor was 
Robert Brinkman . John T. Neilson was .at that time the Director of the Department of Public 
Safety. 
In the ensuing months following the initiation of his employment the plaintiff 
performed his work in an acceptable manner in accordance with his prior training and the 
applicable standards of his profession. Shortly after he began employment however, the 
defendant Robert Brinkman consistently began to impede the plaintiffs work and to 
arbitrarily reprimand or discipline him on the basis that Brinkmans methods were more 
preferable than the plaintiffs in the area of document examinations. Even though Brinkman 
had no specialized training in the field, Plaskon and Brinkman openly clashed in the office. 
In July of 1996 Brinkman attempted to discharge the plaintiff. The plaintiff met 
with John T. Neilson and the discharge was voluntarly rescinded. Plaintiff agreed to undergo 
a psychiatric examination. It was determined that the plaintiff suffered from hypo-glycima 
which caused problems when he was placed under stress and this condition caused him on 
some occasions to have problems with social skills and inhibited his ability to be tolerant of 
others and work with them. The issues between Brinkman and the Plaintiff were not 
resolved and the Plaintiff was ultimately terminated in August of 1996. 
After his termination Petitioner attempted to obtain employment in the area of crime 
scene investigation, document examination, and other forensic fields, but has been 
consistently denied employment based upon false reports generated from the defendants. 
Documents and statements contained in the plaintiffs personnel file have either been shown 
to or discussed with potential employers. Many of the statements contained therein are 
either false, dileberately misleading or incomplete and consitiute a continuing deliberate 
attempt on the part of Brinkman and the representatives of the State of Utah to prevent 
Plaintiff from working in his chosen field. 
The continuing efforts by the defendants to defame the Petitioner by the 
dissemination of the statements contained in his personnel file have effectively chilled his 
ability to obtain any type of employment in his chosen filed and this defamation continues to 
the present time. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The case upon which both the defendants and the court relied to dismiss plaintiffs 
claims, Retheford vs. AT&T Communications 844 P. 2d 949 (UT 1992) in actuality 
supports plaintiffs analysis that he has demonstrated at least to the extent of surviving a 
motion to dismiss that the continuing nature of the defamation allows the filling of the 
Complaint to relate back to the time of Plaintiffs termination in 1986. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court must review the Lower Courts ruling in this case regarding the Supreme 
Courts decision in Retheford vs. AT&T Communications844 P. 2d 949 (UT 1992) for 
correctness. The entire case is appended hereto as Addendum "A" 
It is Plaintiffs position that the Retheford case is fact specific, and therefore the facts 
are extremely critical in analyzing the cases' impact on the Plaintiffs claim in the Court 
below.. 
In 1976 Retherford was hired as a telephone operator in Grand Junction, Colorado, 
by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company. In 1983 she was transferred to the 
Wasatch office in Salt Lake City where she continued to work as a telephone operator. 
During her employment she was covered by two different agreements. One was a collective 
bargaining agreement between AT&T and her Union, the Communication Workers of 
America, the other a code of conduct promulgated by AT&T that outlined employees rights 
and responsibilities. 
Retherford contended throughout her lawsuit that this code of conduct created an 
implied employment contract. Both of these agreements prohibited sexual harassment and 
outlined procedures for grieved employees to process complaints. Immediately upon her 
arrival in Salt Lake City, Retherford noticed a sexually uninhibited atmosphere in the office. 
In fact on her very first day at work she was shown an obscene Valentines card and was 
subjected to obscene jokes and foul language. She changed shifts six months later to a night 
shift and continued to encounter more sexually suggestive discussions. During the night 
shift she also found herself the target of sexually suggestive commentary, in the form of 
unwelcome sexual advances. This conduct continued for approximately ten (10) months and 
she discussed the possibility of filing an EEO Complaint if the conduct continued. She then 
began to be retaliated against by other employees. She complained to her supervisor and 
other managers of the retaliatory harassment and then ultimately filed a written complaint to 
AT&T's EEO coordinator. 
Ultimately the stress of her work and coping with the retaliatory actions began to 
take its toll. In September of 1985, Retherford took medical leave to recover from the stress 
and anxiety. Approximately six (6) months later she was told that she was being transferred 
to Boise Idaho, which she refused. She was given a deadline to report to Boise, and was 
fired on March 26, 1986. She had filed a written grievance through the union but the 
grievance was not timely filed, pursuant to the agreement and therefore was dismissed. 
Approximately two and a half years later, in September, 1988, she filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging various Federal and State claims. The 
Court dismissed the Federal claims with prejudice, as being untimely, and dismissed the 
State claims without prejudice for lack of pendant jurisdiction. (This Court should take 
specific note that this procedural history is very similar to the present case.) 
Retherford then filed suit in the Third Judicial District Court in Utah, alleging the 
State claims. One of the causes of action filed was the intentional infliction of emotional 
stress by the various individuals during the period of her employment. The defendant's filed 
a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that she had alleged that she was subjected to 
approximately eighteen (18) months of retaliatory abuse during the period of March 1984 to 
September of 1985, when she took a leave from her job to seek psychiatric attention. The 
applicable statute of limitations was four years. She did not file her suit until April of 1989. 
The defendant's argued that because the abuse had taken place over an eighteen (18) month 
period, and it was obvious to her that she was being abused, the statute began running in 
March of 1984, and therefore her suit was barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
The Court was asked to consider the continuing nature of the emotional harassment 
as to whether or not it tolled the statute of limitations. The Court essentially determined that 
it did not need to make a ruling as to whether there was a continuing violation, because the 
Court determined that the critical time frame was when the plaintiff left her job to seek 
medical and psychiatric attention, and did not return to work for six months. Therefore, 
there was a factual inference that the extreme emotional distress did not come into existence 
before September of 1985, and this was enough for the claim to survive a motion for 
Summary Judgement with respect to the problem of the statute of limitations. The Court 
specifically noted that the Defendant's would have their chance at trial to prove that the 
element of extreme emotional distress occurred sometime before the leave of absence. 
Although the Court was not called upon to decide the issue of what a continuing 
violation is, the Court does reference in Footnote 18 other Federal cases, which discuss the 
issue and also notes that other Courts consider certain factors which are relevant to but not 
dispositive of the issue of what a continuing violation is. The first is subject matter. 
Obviously Petitioner's allegations of disseminating untrue information about him over a 
period of years qualifies. The frequency issue clearly favors Petitioner. They are not 
isolated incidents, but continuing incidents that extend over a number of years of making 
his file available through GRAMMA and other reporting services so that any potential 
employer could review the documents. The third area is the permanence issue, which 
focuses upon the degree of permanence which should trigger an employee's awareness of 
duty to protect his rights. Part of the problem in this case is that petitioner was not aware of 
the accessibility to her personnel file or what was included in his file until two years ago. 
He filed his notice of claim within one year of discovering the contents, and the subsequent 
lawsuit was within the statute of limitation. Therefore even if the Court believes that the law 
in Utah, as set forth in Footnote 18 Plaskon is within the statute of limitations. The case is 
still in effect and has not been modified or overruled, nor have the comments made in 
footnote 18 been made part of any official decision of this Court or utilized in any 
subsequent decision. In effect the law is not settled in the State of Utah on this particular 
subject. 
The Plaintiff believes that while the footnote is persuasive, it is dicta and is not part 
of the holding of the case, and therefore the case does not provide any precedential value for 
this Court. Notwithstanding, that argument Plaintiff believes that his case falls within the 
parameters of footnote 18 and therefore would meet its requirements. The actual holding of 
7 
the Retherford case would leave the whole issue of the effect of the continuing defamation 
and interference with economic ability to a fact finder, and certainly that survives a motion 
to dismiss. 
Motions to dismiss or for Summary Judgement are not favored unless it is clear that 
there are no issues of fact or law that are in dispute. On appeal the Appellate Court must 
review the facts presented and all the references fairly arising therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the party against whom the judgement has been granted, in this case the 
Plaintiff. See Winegar vs. Froerer Corporation 813 P. 2d. 1405 (UT1991). In addition an 
Appellate Court should accord no deference to a Trial Courts legal conclusions given 
support of Dismissal and reviews them for correctness. Shurtz vs. BMW of N.M. Inc. 814 P. 
2d 1108 (Utah 1991) There are clearly factual disputes in this case and the interpretation and 
application of Retherford was clearly in dispute before the lower Court and therefore 
requires resolution by this Court. The case was therefore not appropriate for either dismissal 
or summary judgement and this Court should review Judge Medley's decision for 
correctness and determine that the granting of Defendants Motion was improper and the case 
should be remanded for a full evidentiary trial. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should review the Lower Courts ruling to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint 
on the basis of its legal analysis of the Retheford case for corectness and must review the 
Plaintiffs factual allegations in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. In this case the Courts 
granting of the Motion to Dismiss. Under those standards of the Courts granting of the 
Motion to Dismiss was not appropriate. The case should be remanded for a full trial on the 
merits. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to counsel for the Defendant, Jan Graham, Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid this ^ d a y of June, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM "A 
Page 1 
tation/Title 
4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
tah 1992) 
*949 844 P.2d 949 
142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2668, 124 Lab.Cas. P 57,203, 
8 IER Cases 405 
Debra S. RETHERFORD, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
AT & T COMMUNICATIONS OF the MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; Cathy 
Bateson; Louise Johnson; Vickie Randall; and 
Doe I through Doe X, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 890464. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 9, 1992. 
Former employee brought suit against employer, supervisors, and co-workers 
ising from alleged sexual harassment and retaliation for complaining about 
*ual harassment by co-workers. Summary judgment was granted in favor of 
fendants on all claims by the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J. 
mis Frederick, J., and former employee appealed. The Supreme Court, 
nmerman, J., held that: (1) tort action for discharge in violation of Utah 
Dlic policy is not limited to employees at-will; (2) exclusive remedy for 
scharge in violation of public policy was the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act; 
) Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempted former employee's claims for 
Bach of implied contract and malicious interference with contractual 
Lations, and preempted some of claims for intentional infliction of emotional 
stress; and (4) employee stated cause of action against co-workers for 
:entional infliction of emotional distress. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Howe, Associate C.J., filed opinion concurring with reservations. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
APPEAL AND ERROR <£=>934(1) 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k934 Judgment 
30k934(1) In general, 
ih 1992. 
Although failure of trial court to issue statement of grounds for granting 
imary judgment is not reversible error absent unusual circumstances, 
^sumption of correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings on appeal has 
tie operative effect when members of Supreme Court cannot define trial 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Page 2 
4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
tah 1992) 
urt!s reasoning because of cryptic nature of its ruling. Rules Civ.Proc, 
les 52(a), 56(c). 
APPEAL AND ERROR <®=>8 63 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of Decision Appealed 
from 
30k863 In general. 
ah 1992. 
Because summary judgment resolves only questions of law, Supreme Court gives 
deference to trial court's determinations, and affirms only if decision 
fore it is correct. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
MASTER AND SERVANT <®=>34.1 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k34 Actions for Wrongful Discharge 
255k34.1 In general. 
Formerly 255k34 
ah 1992. 
Tort of discharge in violation of public policy is available to all 
Dloyees, even those with employment contract protecting them from discharge 
:hout just cause. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <®=>30(1.10) 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k30 Grounds and Liabilities 
255k30(1.10) Public policy considerations. 
ih 1992. 
Not every discharge in violation of contractual just-cause provision rises to 
rel of violation of public policy; only those policies that are clear and 
)stantial and arise from statutes or Constitutions qualify for vindication 
rough tort of discharge in violation of public policy. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <®=>30(1.10) 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k30 Grounds and Liabilities 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
tah 1992) 
255k30(1.10) Public policy considerations, 
ah 1992. 
While any employer violating contractual just-cause standard of dismissal is 
able for breaking its promise to its employee, employer who violates clear and 
bstantial public policies, so as to give rise to tort of discharge in 
olation of public policy, should be liable for more expensive penalties of 
rt, a potentially harsher liability commensurate with greater wrong against 
ciety; when employer's act violates both its own contractual just-cause 
andard and clear and substantial public policy, employer is liable for two 
saches, one in contract and one in tort, and must bear consequences of both. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <@^ =>35 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k34 Actions for Wrongful Discharge 
255k35 Nature and form, 
ah 1992. 
Under Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act in effect at time of employee's firing in 
36, Act was exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against employee who 
nplained of sexual harassment, preempting common-law causes of action for 
:aliation for complaints of employment discrimination. U.C.A.1953, 
-35-6(1) (a) (i) , 34-35-7.1(15); U.C.A.1953, 34-35-2(7), 24-25-7.1(11) (1989). 
STATUTES <&=>190 
361 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl87 Meaning of Language 
361kl90 Existence of ambiguity, 
ih 1992. 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, Supreme Court will not 
)k beyond it to define legislative intent. 
STATUTES <®^205 
361 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic Aids to Construction 
361k205 In general, 
h 1992. 
Statute is interpreted as a whole, not piecemeal. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <2^ =>10.5 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(B) Statutory Regulation 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
rtah 1992) 
255kl0.5 Statutory provisions. 
Formerly 255kl01/2 
ah 1992. 
Amendment to Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act to prohibit retaliation was not 
ange in substantive law, so as to indicate that prior law did not prohibit 
taliation, but, rather, was only clarification. U.C.A.1953, 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i), 
-35-7.1(15); U.C.A.1953, 34-35-2(7), 34-35-7.1(11) (1989). 
ACTION <@=>35 
13 
1311 Nature and Form 
13k33 Statutory Remedies 
13k35 Cumulative or exclusive remedies, 
ah 1992. 
"Indispensable element test," under which exclusive statutory cause of action 
eempts common-law claim based on same facts when statutory scheme supplies 
dispensable element of tort claim, is correct analytical model for determining 
ether statutory cause of action forecloses common-law remedy. 
e publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and 
finitions. 
ACTION <£^ >35 
13 
1311 Nature and Form 
13k33 Statutory Remedies 
13k35 Cumulative or exclusive remedies; 
ah 1992. 
"Indispensable element test" for determining when legislative enactment 
Dplies exclusive remedy relies on neither timing nor conduct to determine 
^eruption; instead, under such test, preemption depends on nature of injury 
r which plaintiff makes claim, not nature of defendant's act which plaintiff 
Leges to have been responsible for that injury. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION <@^2093 
413 
413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or Common-Law Rights of Action 
and Defenses 
413XX(A) Between Employer and Employee 
413XX(A)1 Exclusiveness of Remedies Afforded by Acts 
413k2093 Willful or deliberate act or negligence, 
ih 1992. 
Tort suit by employee against fellow employee for injury caused by 
:entional tort is not barred by exclusivity provision of workers' *949 
apensation law. 
DAMAGES <©^50.10 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Page 5 
4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
tah 1992) 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct. 
[See headnote text below] 
MASTER AND SERVANT <®^35 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k34 Actions for Wrongful Discharge 
255k35 Nature and form, 
ah 1992. 
Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act preempted state law tort claims by former 
Dloyee, who was discharged after she complained about sexual harassment, for 
scharge in violation of public policy, but did not preempt other claims for 
^ach of implied contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
Licious interference with contractual relations, and negligent employment of 
:assers. U.C.A.1953, 34-35-1 to 34-35-7.1. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <@=>30(1.10) 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k30 Grounds and Liabilities 
255k30(1. 10) Public policy considerations, 
ih 1992. 
In determining whether public policy is sufficiently "clear and substantial" 
support cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy, one must 
imine strength of policy as well as extent to which it affects public as 
)le; words "clear and substantial" require lack of ambiguity on both points, 
1 all statements made in statute are not expressions of public policy. 
i publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and 
"initions. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <S=>30(1.10) 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k30 Grounds and Liabilities 
255k30(1.10) Public policy considerations. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Page 6 
4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
tah 1992) 
ah 1992. 
Questions relevant to determining whether statute embodies "clear and 
bstantial public policy," so as to support tort of discharge in violation of 
blic policy, include: whether policy in question is one of overarching 
portance to public, as opposed to parties only; and whether public interest 
so strong and policy so clear and weighty that we should place policy beyond 
ach of contract, thereby constituting bar to discharge that parties cannot 
dify, even when freely willing and with equal bargaining power. 
e publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and 
finitions. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <@^ =>4 0(3.1) 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551(C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k34 Actions for Wrongful Discharge 
255k40 Evidence 
255k40(3) Weight and Sufficiency 
255k40(3.1) In general. 
Formerly 255k40(3) 
ah 1992. 
For employee to prevail on claim of breach of implied contract, employee must 
Dve existence of implied contract, created by mutual assent, and employer's 
Llure to comply with its terms. 
DAMAGES <S^50.10 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct. 
ih 1992. 
To prevail on claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising 
)m sexual harassment by co-workers, former employee was required to prove that 
: co-workers either intentionally or recklessly engaged in intolerable and 
:rageous conduct that caused her severe emotional distress. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <2^341 
255 
255V Interfer ence with the Relation by Third Persons 
255V(A) Civil Liability 
255k341 Injury to servant by malicious procurement of discharge, 
ih 1992. 
To prevail on claim of malicious interference with contractual relations, 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
tah 1992) 
rmer employee was required to prove that her co-workers, whether separately or 
conspiracy, intentionally and improperly persuaded employer to breach its 
ployment contract with employee. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <®^303 
255 
255IV Liabilities for Injuries to Third Persons 
255IV(A) Acts or Omissions of Servant 
255k303 Incompetency of servant, 
ah 1992. 
To prevail on claim of negligent employment against employer, employee was 
quired to prove that employer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or 
taining its employees proximately caused her harm. 
LABOR RELATIONS <@==>4 5 
232A 
232AII Labor Relations Acts 
232Ak42 Validity 
232Ak45 Effect of federal legislation. 
Formerly 360kl8.45 
[See headnote text below] 
STATES <£^>18.46 
360 
3601 Political Status and Relations 
3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 
360kl8.45 Labor and Employment 
360kl8.46 In general, 
ah 1992. 
Preemption provision of the LMRA preempts any common-law claim that is 
bstantially dependent on analysis of collective bargaining agreement. Labor 
nagement Relations Act, 1947, §§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a). 
LABOR RELATIONS <@^ >4 5 
232A 
232AII Labor Relations Acts 
232Ak42 Validity 
232Ak45 Effect of federal legislation. 
Formerly 360kl8.45 
[See headnote text below] 
STATES <@==>18.46 
360 
3601 Political Status and Relations 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
bah 1992) 
3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 
360kl8.45 Labor and Employment 
360kl8.46 In general, 
ah 1992. 
Even if dispute resolution pursuant to collective bargaining agreement, on 
a hand, and state law, on other, would require addressing precisely same set 
facts, state law claim is "independent" of agreement, and not preempted by 
RA, as long as state law claim can be resolved without interpreting agreement 
self. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 
5, 185(a) . 
2 publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and 
Einitions. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <£=>34.1 
255 
2551 The Relation 
2551 (C) Termination, Discharge, and Discipline 
2551(C)2 Discharge or Discipline 
255k34 Actions for Wrongful Discharge 
255k34.1 In general. 
Formerly 255k34 
ah 1992. 
Claims by former employee, who alleged that she was discharged in retaliation 
: complaining about sexual harassment, that discharge breached obligation 
ier implied contract and that co-workers maliciously interfered with 
ltractual relation, resulting in breach of implied contract, were based on 
Dlied contract that was unenforceable as inconsistent with collective 
rgaining agreement; providing any remedy under implied contract where no 
aedy was available under collective bargaining agreement, because time for 
)itration has passed, would put former employee in more advantageous position 
m other employees bound by collective bargaining agreement. Labor Management 
.ations Act, 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185; National Labor Relations Act, § 
0/ as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). 
TORTS <©=>12 
379 
379kl2 Interference with or injuries in contractual relations, 
ih 1992. 
Plaintiff may not maintain cause of action for malicious interference with 
itract if contract was illegal or contrary to public policy. 
DAMAGES <£=>50.10 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
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115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct. *949 
[See headnote text below] 
STATES <2^ =>18. 15 
360 
3601 Political Status and Relations 
3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 
360kl8.15 Particular cases, preemption or supersession, 
ah 1992. 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against co-workers and 
pervisors by former employee, who alleged that she was sexually harassed and 
at when she complained other harassment intensified, were preempted by LMRA to 
tent that claims were against supervisors for reprimanding her, ordering her 
report to another city to work within ten days, and assigning her certain 
sks, raising questions about authority under collective bargaining agreement, 
t other allegations that co-workers, followed her around office and attempted 
frighten her as she crossed street involved purely personal misconduct, and 
re not preempted. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §§ 301, 301(a), 29 
S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a). 
DAMAGES <@=^50.10 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct, 
ah 1992. 
To sustain her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
aintiff must show that defendant's conduct was outrageous and intolerable and 
at it offended against generally accepted standards of decency and morality, 
at defendants intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of likelihood 
causing, emotional distress, that plaintiff suffered severe emotional 
stress, and that defendants' conduct: proximately caused emotional distress. 
DAMAGES <®^ >5 0. 10 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct. 
[See headnote text below] 
STATES <£==>18.15 
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360 
3601 Political Status and Relations 
3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 
360kl8.15 Particular cases, preemption or supersession, 
ah 1992. 
In determining whether LMRA preempts tort claims alleging intentional 
fliction of emotional distress by supervisor or fellow employee, distinction 
made between situations in which defendant has misused his or her authority 
der collective bargaining agreement to torment plaintiff and situations in 
ich defendant has inflicted distress through conduct that is purely personal 
d does not implicate exercise of supervisory authority; the former is 
eempted, while the latter is not. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §§ 
1, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a). 
MASTER AND SERVANT <£=>32 5 
255 
255IV Liabilities for Injuries to Third Persons 
255IV(C) Actions 
255k325 Nature and form. 
Formerly 360kl8.45 
[See headnote text below] 
STATES <®^18.46 
360 
3601 Political Status and Relations 
3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 
360kl8.45 Labor and Employment 
60kl8.46 In general, 
ah 1992. 
Tort claim of negligent employment asserted by former employee, who claimed 
at she was sexually harassed by co-workers, against employer was not shown by 
ployee to have been preempted by the LMRA, despite employer's claim that court 
aid have to consider collective bargaining agreement's termination and 
scipline provisions; source of obligation by employer and supervisors was 
olic law and public policy, not private agreements, and employer failed to 
DW that trial court would be required to resort to bargaining agreement to 
bermine whether employer dealt appropriately with co-workers. Labor 
lagement Relations Act, 1947, §§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a). 
MASTER AND SERVANT <@=>330(3) 
255 
255IV Liabilities for Injuries to Third Persons 
255IV(C) Actions 
255k330 Evidence 
255k330(3) Weight and sufficiency, 
ah 1992. 
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To prevail on claim of "negligent employment," employee, who claimed that 
ployer was negligent in hiring co-workers who sexually harassed her, and then 
taliated when she complained, was required to show that employer knew or 
ould have known that co-workers posed foreseeable risk of retaliatory 
rassment to third parties, including fellow employees, that co-workers did 
flict such harm, and that employer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or 
taining employees proximately caused injury. 
e publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and 
finitions. 
MASTER AND SERVANT <®^300 
255 
255IV Liabilities for Injuries to Third Persons 
255IV(A) Acts or Omissions of Servant 
255k300 Nature of master's liability, 
ah 1992. 
Employer's duty toward people whom its employees place in position of 
asonably foreseeable risk or injury does not stem from its private employment 
ntract, but rather stems from duty imposed by state common law. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS <@^55(1) 
241 
241II Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense 
241k55 Torts 
241k55(l) In general, 
ah 1992. 
Tort cause of action accrues for limitation purposes when all its elements 
Tie into being and claim is actionable. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS <@^55(4) 
241 
241II Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense 
241k55 Torts 
241k55(4V Injuries to person, 
ah 1992. 
Claim by former employee against co-workers for intentional infliction of 
Dtional distress as result of alleged harassment and retaliation for 
nplaining about sexual harassment "accrued" for limitations purposes when 
ployee, after almost 18 months of allegedly retaliatory abuse by co-workers, 
Dk medical disability leave at insistance of her psychiatrist, from which she 
ver returned to job. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-1, 78-12-25(3). 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS <2^ =>55(4) 
241 
241II Computation of Period of Limitation 
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24111(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense 
241k55 Torts 
241k55(4) Injuries to person, 
ah 1992. 
Statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress does 
t begin to run until distress is "actually inflicted," i.e., when plaintiff 
ffers severe emotional disturbance. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-1, 78-12-25(3). 
e publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and 
finitions. 
DAMAGES <®=>50.10 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct, 
ah 1992. 
While standard for determining whether plaintiff claiming intentional 
fliction of emotional distress has experienced emotional stress is subjective, 
andard for determining outrageousness of alleged conduct is objective; 
nsequently, plaintiff must show both that reasonable person would consider 
leged conduct to be outrageous and that plaintiff actually experienced 
Djective severe emotional anguish because of objectively outrageous conduct. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS <@^ =>55(2) 
241 
241II Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense 
241k55 Torts 
241k55(2) Negligence, 
ah 1992. 
Generally, statute of limitations on negligent employment claim will *949 
: begin to run until all elements of employer's tort are present. 
DAMAGES <S^50.10 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct, 
ah 1992. 
Allegations by former employee that, after she complained about sexual 
rassment, co-workers shadowed her movements, intimidated her with threatening 
)ks and remarks, and manipulated circumstances at her work in ways that made 
: job more stressful were sufficient to satisfy objective conduct requirement 
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tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress that conduct was 
utrageous and intolerable." 
e publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and 
finitions. 
DAMAGES <@==>50.10 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct, 
ah 1992. 
Standard for determining whether conduct of defendant is sufficiently 
tensive to permit recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is 
Either defendant's actions offend against generally accepted standards of 
^ency and morality. 
DAMAGES <@^ =>50.10 
115 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or 
Losses 
115111(A)2 Mental Suffering 
115k50.10 Intentional, reckless, or outrageous conduct, 
ah 1992. 
Conduct generally labeled as sexual harassment on job satisfies "outrageous 
i intolerable" requirement for tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
stress, and therefore, retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment must 
so be considered "outrageous and intolerable." 
*953 Richard W. Perkins, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Richard M. Hymas, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellees. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case is before us on appeal from a grant of summary judgment dismissing 
lintiff's complaint. Debra S. Retherford sued her former employer, AT & T 
ununications, under several theories for harms arising from alleged sexual 
^assment by her co-employees. Specifically, she alleged that AT & T fired her 
retaliation for complaining of being sexually harassed by her AT & T co-
ders. She argued that such a discharge violated Utah public policy barring 
>risals for reports of sexual harassment. She also contended that the 
;charge breached a term of her implied contract with AT & T, which prohibited 
>risal for reports of sexual harassment and was entirely separate from the 
•eement between her unionfs collective bargaining unit and AT & T. Retherford 
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.rther asserted that AT & T was liable for negligently employing her harassers. 
nally, Retherford sued former co-workers Cathy Bateson (aka Cathy Bateson-
>ugh), Louise Johnson, and Vickie Randall, claiming that their retaliatory 
nduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious 
terference with her contractual relations with AT & T. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming, inter alia, that workers 
vered by employment contracts that prohibit discharge other than for just 
use should not be able to maintain a tort action for discharge in violation of 
blic policy; that the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act ("UADA") preempted 
therford's common law causes of action, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 
988) (amended 1989, 1990 & 1991); that federal labor law preempted 
therford's common law causes of action, see 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); and that 
therford had failed to state tort claims against her former co-workers or to 
ing those claims within the period fixed by the relevant statute of 
mitations. 
The district judge considered affidavits in support of and in opposition to 
e motion to dismiss and granted defendants summary judgment on all claims, 
therford appeals. 
To summarize our ruling today, we hold as follows: first, that both 
ployees covered by employment contracts that limit the bases for discharge and 
ployees who are at-will can maintain a tort action for *954 discharge in 
olation of Utah public policy; second, that the UADA provides the exclusive 
medy for Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of public policy but 
es not bar her other causes of action; third, that federal labor law preempts 
therford's claims for breach of implied contract and malicious interference 
th contractual relations and partially preempts Retherford1s claim for 
tentional infliction of emotional distress; and fourth, that Retherford 
ought her claims for emotional distress and negligent employment in a timely 
nner and has stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
stress against her former co-workers. We therefore reverse the order granting 
ximary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings on Retherford1 s 
aim of negligent employment and the nonpreempted portion of her claim for 
tentional infliction of emotional distress. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all 
asonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
rty. Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992); Rollins v. Petersen, 
3 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991); Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. 
ah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). We state the facts of 
e instant case--which we draw primarily from Retherford's affidavit submitted 
opposition to AT & T's motion to dismiss--accordingly. See Sandy City v. 
It Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 215 (Utah 1992). 
In 1976, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company hired Retherford to 
rk as a telephone operator in Grand Junction, Colorado. In 1983, due to the 
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tionwide restructuring of AT & T and its subsidiary companies, Retherford was 
ansferred to AT & Tfs Wasatch office, located in Salt Lake City, where she 
itinued working as a telephone operator. 
Retherford alleges that two separate agreements governed her employment with 
& T. As an AT & T employee, Retherford was covered by a collective 
rgaining agreement between AT & T and her union, the Communications Workers of 
erica ("CWA"). Independent of the collective bargaining agreement, AT & T 
so had promulgated a code of conduct that outlined employees' rights and 
sponsibilities and was specifically brought to the attention of and 
knowledged in writing by all employees. Retherford argues that the code of 
nduct created an implied employment contract between AT & T and its employees. 
Both the collective bargaining agreement and the code of conduct prohibited 
Kual harassment and outlined procedures for aggrieved employees to press any 
nplaints. The collective bargaining agreement stated, "[N]either the Company 
i: the Union shall unlawfully discriminate against any employee because of such 
Dloyee's race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin or because he or 
B is handicapped, a disabled veteran or a veteran of the Vietnam era." The 
Llective bargaining agreement required resort to arbitration to resolve 
grievances arising out of or resulting from the application or interpretation 
the provisions of this Agreement" and " [g]rievances arising out of or 
suiting from the dismissal, suspension, or demotion of a regular employee...." 
The code of conduct's provision on sexual harassment was more detailed than 
at in the collective bargaining agreement. The code of conduct read in 
Levant part: 
Any sexually harassing conduct in the workplace, whether physical or 
verbal, committed by any employee is also prohibited. This includes: 
repeated offensive sexual flirtations, advances, propositions; continued or 
repeated verbal abuse of a sexual nature; graphic verbal commentaries about 
an individual's body; sexually degrading words used to describe an 
individual; and the display in the workplace of sexually suggestive objects, 
pictures or posters. 
Employees who have complaints of sexual harassment should report such 
conduct to their supervisors. If this is not appropriate, employees are 
urged to seek the assistance of their EEO coordinator. Where the 
investigation confirms *955 the allegations, prompt corrective action 
should be taken. 
Any reprisal against an employee because the employee, in good faith, 
reported a violation or suspected violation is strictly forbidden. 
Soon after Rutherford transferred to Salt Lake City, manager Fayonne 
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hanneson required Retherford meet with her to discuss the provisions of the 
nduct code and to sign a statement saying that she had read and understood 
em. This procedure was repeated every year during Retherford1s tenure at the 
satch office. In an affidavit submitted in opposition to defendants1 motion 
dismiss, Retherford termed this annual procedure "a condition of her 
ntinued employment" with AT & T. 
Among Retherford1s co-workers at the Wasatch office were Cathy Bateson-Hough, 
AT & T manager, Louise Johnson, a supervisor, Vickie Randall, a fellow 
ployee and union steward, and Jolene Gailey, (FN1) a fellow telephone 
erator. Upon her arrival in Salt Lake City, she noticed the sexually 
inhibited atmosphere of the Wasatch office. In her affidavit, Retherford 
stified that during her first day at work, Bateson-Hough showed her an obscene 
lentine's Day card. Soon Retherford became aware that obscene jokes and foul 
nguage were commonplace among her co-workers. 
After approximately six months, Retherford switched to the night shift. At 
is time, she encountered a more sexually suggestive work environment, one she 
und threatening. As before, she noted that sex was a common topic of 
scussion. For example, in her affidavit she described Johnsonfs loud accounts 
an alleged sexual relationship with another AT & T employee. 
For the first time, however, Retherford found herself a target of the 
xually suggestive commentary. Specifically, she alleges that Jolene Gailey 
bjected her to unwelcome sexual advances. Retherford's affidavit describes 
ese advances as follows: 
Retherford complains that Gailey touched her, made numerous comments 
garding her appearance, and regularly suggested that Retherford join her "in 
rious activities." Gaileyfs friends, including defendant Johnson, also began 
congregate around Retherford, conversing frequently and explicitly about 
bjects of a sexual nature. As time passed, Gailey became more aggressive, 
en "visibly intoxicated, " Gailey sat next to Retherford, touched her 
fectionately on the arm, and said, "Ifm going to save you from Dave Todd," a 
le AT & T employee with whom Retherford had been sitting at meals. Gailey 
bsequently asked Retherford to pose nude while Gailey painted or sculpted her 
keness, told Retherford that she was looking for a roommate, and informed 
therford that she hated men and even the sound of men's voices on the 
lephone. Retherford also believes that Gailey passed a note around the office 
ating that Retherford was having an affair with a male AT & T employee. 
After approximately ten months of such treatment, Gailey telephoned 
therford at home and asked her if she intended to file an EEOC complaint about 
iley's conduct. (FN2) Retherford testified in her affidavit that she replied 
at she would file a complaint if Gailey continued to bother her. According to 
therford's affidavit, Gailey responded, "I'm sorry if I offended you, but I 
el I shouldn't have to apologize for my sexuality." 
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Retherford testified in her affidavit that after she informed Gailey that she 
3 considering filing a complaint of sexual harassment, Gailey and other AT & T 
Dloyees began to retaliate by staring at her, making "threatening facial 
pressions" at her, walking extremely close to *956 her, and following her 
Dund the office. During March of 1984, Retherford twice complained to her 
oervisor and manager of the retaliatory harassment from Gailey and other co-
ckers. Two months later, she wrote manager Bateson-Hough a letter complaining 
at Gailey continued to harass her despite her requests that Gailey leave her 
Dne. The next day, May 10, 1984, Retherford submitted a written complaint to 
& T's Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") coordinator. 
About five days later, Richard Salazar, an AT & T employee and a CWA union 
Bward, called Retherford at home to discuss the complaint she had submitted, 
iherford testified that Salazar told her, "You're the new kid on the block--
i're not going to win this. We don't know you very well, but we do know 
Lene [Gailey], she is a respectable person in the community and an artist." 
added, "Somebody could get fired over this." Darlene Anderson, a first-
jel manager of the Wasatch office, also cautioned Retherford, saying, "Just be 
ireful what you say and do; this is a strong and big group that you are 
aling with." Several weeks after Retherford complained to the AT & T EEO 
Drdinator, she was attempting to cross the street at 1:15 a.m. when Gailey 
sd past her. When Retherford reached her own car and drove away, Gailey 
Llowed her for a few miles. 
During June of 1984, Linda Johnston, an AT & T employee who Retherford says 
a personal friend of Bateson-Hough's, investigated Retherford's complaint. 
:herford said that Johnston's investigation consisted solely of personal 
:erviews with and submission of written statements by Retherford and Gailey. 
DUt one month later, Johnston submitted the EEO coordinator's report, which 
:ommended that Retherford and Gailey have as little contact with each other as 
ssible. Subsequently, Retherford received a telephone call from Reta Pehrson, 
AT & T supervisor and CWA vice president, who told her, "You have to be 
:isfied with the [EEO coordinator's] decision.... If anybody asks you about 
, don't tell them and don't say anything." Pehrson added, "Cathy [Bateson-
agh] wanted me to also tell you that if you would like a transfer, she will 
msfer you to the Sundance Office." 
Retherford stated in her affidavit that the harassment in the Wasatch office 
i not abate following the issuance of the EEO coordinator's report and 
commendations. At one point, Retherford overheard an AT & T employee say to a 
:>up of co-workers, including defendant Johnson, "Debi [Retherford] would make 
jood stripper--she has big boobs." Looking directly at Retherford, Johnson 
Dlied, "My bra size is 34B." Retherford said that Gailey and other co-
rkers continued to stare at her, walk close to her, follow her, and make faces 
her. She also said that on at least one occasion, Gailey and Johnson accused 
:herford of staring at them. 
In late August of 1984, Retherford filed a charge letter with the EEOC, 
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leging that some of her co-workers had sexually harassed her for a year and 
at AT & T had done nothing to remedy the situation. Several months later, 
fred Aros, an EEOC investigator, called Retherford at home to tell her that of 
e four witnesses he had interviewed while investigating her complaint, three 
d told him there was a "lesbian problem" at the Wasatch office. He said he 
tended to issue a warning to AT & T management about this situation. Around 
e same time, the AT & T EEO coordinator surveyed the workers in the Wasatch 
fice about sexual harassment and eventually issued a report concluding that 
ployees at the Wasatch office engaged in a great deal of sexually oriented 
scussion, including many obscene jokes. This report failed to curb the sexual 
mosphere in the Wasatch office. Indeed, Retherford testified in her affidavit 
at after its issuance, the obscene jokes and explicit sexual conversations 
creased in frequency and offensiveness. 
In late December of 1984, Retherford again delivered a written complaint to 
teson-Hough. Retherford says that Bateson-Hough summoned her and told her 
at the AT & T EEO coordinator had issued a letter chastising both Retherford 
d Gailey for their continued quarreling. *957 She refused to show 
therford the letter. Bateson-Hough also informed Retherford that Retherford 
s on warning of dismissal and told her that AT & T would fire her if she 
ntinued to complain about Gailey. 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that the abuse by her co-workers 
ntinued, exacerbated by the perception that she was an informant. In 
therford1s presence, Johnson and others made various comments lamenting the 
ct that someone was watching them and would report them if they broke company 
les. Following one such comment, Johnson looked at Retherford and said, 
sn't that right, Debi?" Retherford also said that Bateson-Hough made no 
fort to protect her from this retaliation. In fact, she said, Bateson-Hough 
arranged the seating in the Wasatch office, placing Retherford next to some of 
r harassers and assigning her to "slow" work stations, which hampered her 
oductivity. 
To cope with the stress of her work place, Retherford began visiting a 
ychiatrist and a physician in the summer of 1985. In September of 1985, 
therford says, she took medical disability leave to recover from the stress 
d anxiety caused by the harassment. Following her psychiatristfs instructions 
at she must not work in proximity to "the people who started the panic in 
r," she never returned to the Wasatch office. 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that on or about March 12, 1986, 
uglas Erickson, group manager of the Wasatch office, and Vickie Randall, an AT 
T employee and union steward, called Retherford to tell her that because she 
s medically incapable of returning to the Wasatch office, AT & T was 
ansferring her to its office in Boise, Idaho. Erickson ordered her to report 
her new assignment within ten days. When Retherford protested that her 
mily obligations and medical treatment in Salt Lake City prevented her from 
ving to Boise on such short notice, Randall responded, "What do you expect us 
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do, build you a new building?'1 Erickson then advised Retherford that if she 
iled to report to the Boise office within ten days, AT & T would fire her. 
Retherford did not report to Boise by the deadline, and AT & T fired her on 
rch 26, 1986. She filed a written grievance with the CWA, Local 7704, on 
ril 9th. On September 29th, the vice president of Local 7704 told Retherford 
at due to an oversight on the part of the CWA, the union had not submitted her 
ievance for arbitration and that the time for processing her grievance, as 
tablished by the bargaining agreement, had expired. 
On July 21, 1988, two years and four months after she was fired, Retherford 
led suit in United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging 
deral claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
00e-2, -3, and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
5, and pendent state UADA and common law claims. On March 21, 1989, the court 
smissed the federal claims with prejudice as being untimely and dismissed the 
ate claims without prejudice for lack of pendent jurisdiction. Retherford v. 
Sc T, No. C-88-648W, slip op. (D.Utah Mar. 16, 1989) (unpublished). 
On April 7, 1989, Retherford filed suit in the Third Judicial District Court, 
leging the following: first, that AT & T fired her in violation of Utah 
blic policy, which bars reprisals for reporting sexual harassment; second, 
at AT & T's discharging her in retaliation for complaining of sexual 
rassment violated a term of an employment contract implied from AT & T's code 
conduct; third, that AT & T was liable for negligently employing 
therford's sexual harassers; fourth, that Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and Randall 
tentionally inflicted emotional distress on Retherford; and fifth, that 
teson-Hough, Johnson, and Randall maliciously interfered with Retherford's 
ntractual relations. 
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing first, that Utah does not recognize a 
timon law cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy; second, 
at even if Utah did recognize such a cause of action, federal and state anti-
scrimination *958 laws would preempt any such claim; third, that as a 
tter of federal labor law, the AT & T-CWA collective bargaining agreement 
rred Retherford's state claims; fourth, that Retherford had failed to timely 
sert her state law claims for negligent employment, breach of implied 
ntract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and fifth, that 
therford had failed to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
stress because the conduct she alleged did not "offend against the generally 
cepted standards of indecency and immorality," as required by Utah case law. 
M3) 
[1] Relying on affidavits in reaching its decision, the trial court treated 
fendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See Utah 
3iv.P. 12(c), 56(c). The court entered judgment in favor of AT & T, Bateson-
jgh, Johnson, and Randall, offering the following explanation for the ruling: 
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[T]he Court having found that there are no genuine issues of material fact; 
and the Court having further determined that Defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law ... [,] Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, which is 
being treated as a motion for summary judgment, is hereby granted. (FN4) 
Retherford appeals. 
[2] Before addressing the merits, we note the applicable standard of review, 
mmary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact 
ists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
Civ.P. 56(c); Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 217-18; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; 
ndes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). Because a summary 
dgment resolves only questions of law, we give no deference to the trial 
urt!s determinations. We affirm only if the decision before us was correct. 
ndy City, 827 P.2d at 218; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; Landes, 795 P.2d at 
29. 
The present appeal requires that we examine the interplay between statutory 
uses of action and common law tort and contract causes of action for discharge 
retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. We first address the 
mmon law. In the last decade, state courts have shown a growing willingness 
increase employer exposure to suit for claims relating to the discharge of 
ployees, a trend that has taken a number of different forms. James N. 
rtouzos & Lynn A. Karoly, Labor-Market Responses to Employer Liability viii 
he RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1992). In Utah, this court has joined the 
tional trend by converting into a rebuttable presumption the common law rule 
at absent an express agreement, employment was at-will, see Berube v. Fashion 
ntre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, 
); id. at 1051-52 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), by recognizing 
plied employment contracts, see id. at 1044-46, 1049 (Durham, J., joined by 
ewart, J.); id. at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), and by 
opting the tort of discharge in violation of public policy, see Peterson v. 
owning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); 
'. at 1285 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring). See generally Janet Hugie Smith & Lisa 
Yerkovich, Utah Employment Law Since Berube, Utah Bar J., Oct. 1992, at 15. 
*959 In making these changes to Utah's common law, we did not address the 
tent to which the availability of preexisting statutory and contractual 
medies for employers' malfeasance against employees would affect the 
ailability of these new common law contract and tort causes of action, 
therford puts this question squarely before us. She asserts only common law 
rt and contract claims, apparently because the statute of limitations has run 
any claims for relief she might have had under federal and state 
tidiscrimination statutes, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Utah Code Ann. § 
-35-7.1; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 
Ct. 1817, 1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and federal labor law, see DelCostello 
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International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 
L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) . 
Her appeal presents the following novel questions: First, when an employee 
s a contractual right to be fired only for just cause and therefore has a 
each of contract claim if he or she can demonstrate discharge on some other 
ound, such as retaliation for exercising a legal right, should we allow a 
mmon law tort action for discharge in violation of public policy that is based 
the same facts that underlie the claim for breach of contract? Second, does 
e Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act's exclusive remedy provision preempt common law 
uses of action based on the same facts necessary to prove a cause of action 
der the statute, including common law causes of action for discharge in 
olation of public policy, breach of implied contract, negligent employment, 
tentional infliction of emotional distress, or malicious interference with 
ntract? Third, does federal labor law preempt these same claims? Fourth, 
neither state nor federal statute preempts her claims against her co-workers, 
Retherford's assertion of these claims timely? Fifth, if neither state nor 
deral statute preempts Retherford's claim for intentional infliction of 
otional distress, is the conduct Retherford alleges sufficiently severe to 
tisfy the standard we have set for this tort? We will discuss each issue in 
rn. 
[3] We begin with defendants' contention that we should not allow an employee 
th an employment contract that protects him or her from discharge without just 
use—a contract that would prohibit discharge in violation of public policy--
maintain a common law tort action for discharge in violation of public 
licy. Defendants argue that because the facts Retherford alleges constitute a 
use of action for breach of her collective bargaining agreement's just-cause 
ovision, she is precluded from seeking tort damages for the same conduct. 
The AT & T-CWA collective bargaining agreement provides the premise for 
fendants' argument. It requires arbitration for "[g]rievances arising out of 
resulting from the dismissal ... of a regular employee," and it states that a 
smissal "shall stand unless it is established that the dismissal ... was 
fected without just cause.1' (Emphasis added.) Defendants contend that the 
ncept of "just cause" should exclude all reasons for discharge that are . 
consistent with public policy. They argue that because the contractual 
ovision protecting an employee from all but a just-cause dismissal protects 
e same interests as a tort cause of action for discharge in violation of 
blic policy, no purpose is served by permitting a discharged employee to 
oceed on the tort claim when he or she has a contractual cause of action, 
fendants contend that the contractual provision adequately vindicates the 
blic policy underlying the tort claim. 
We disagree. Our recent decision in Peterson, which adopted a tort action 
r discharges in violation of public policy and was decided after the briefing 
d argument of the present case, requires rejection of defendants' argument. 
adopted in Peterson, the tort of discharge in violation of public policy 
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ffers in both scope and sanction from any contractual provision that might 
mit an employer's power to discharge an employee for other than just cause, 
e Peterson 832 P.2d at 1282-83, 1285 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. 
1285-86 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring). Both respect for precedent and sound 
blic *960 policy compel the conclusion that the tort of discharge in 
olation of public policy should be available to all employees, regardless of 
eir contractual status. 
Our reasoning, is as follows: First, the logic of Peterson and of the earlier 
rube decision indicates that the cause of action for discharge in violation of 
blic policy limits the power of all employers to discharge employees, without 
gard to whether the employee is at-will or protected by an express or implied 
ployment contract. See id. at 1287 n. 2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and 
ssenting, joined by Hall, C.J.); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043 n. 10 (Utah 1989) 
pinion of Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., 
ncurring in the result). A primary purpose behind giving employees a right to 
e for discharges in violation of public policy is to protect the vital state 
terests embodied in such policies. We cannot fulfill such a purpose if we 
nge this cause of action on employees1 contractual status and thus limit its 
ailability to any one class of employees. See Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1287 n. 2 
immerman, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Petermann v. International 
d. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local 396, 11A 
l.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959). 
[4] Second, not every discharge in violation of a contractual just-cause 
ovision rises to the level of a violation of public policy. As Justice Durham 
inted out in Peterson, only those public policies that are "clear" and 
ubstantial" and arise from statutes or constitutions qualify for vindication 
rough the tort of discharge in violation of public policy. 832 P.2d at 1282. 
nsequently, the overlap of a contractual just-cause cause of action and a 
blic policy tort cause of action is not as great as defendants would have us 
lieve. 
[5] Finally, the vindication of public policy worked by the tort cause of 
tion cannot be accomplished by a contractual provision that prohibits 
scharges for any but just cause. Even when a contract prohibits conduct that 
so would violate public policy, the remedies for breach of that contract would 
tisfy only the private interests of the parties to the agreement, i.e., by 
storing a wrongfully discharged employee to his or her position and making him 
her whole. There is no reason to expect that these remedies would be as 
aconian as those that might be available under the tort cause of action, 
medies that are designed not only to remedy the breach and make the employee 
ole, but to deter and punish violations of vital state interests. While any 
ployer violating a contractual just-cause standard of dismissal should be 
able for breaking its promise to its employee, Peterson dictates that an 
ployer who violates clear and substantial public policies should be liable for 
e more expansive penalties of tort, a potentially harsher liability 
mmensurate with the greater wrong against society. When an employer's act 
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olates both its own contractual just-cause standard and a clear and 
bstantial public policy, we see no reason to dilute the force of the double 
nction. In such an instance, the employer is liable for two breaches, one in 
ntract and one in tort. It therefore must bear the consequences of both. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendants' argument. We hold that the 
rt of discharge in violation of public policy is a limitation on all 
scharges, not merely an exception to the at-will doctrine. See Peterson, 832 
2d at 1287 n. 2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Hall, 
J.); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043 n. 10 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by 
ewart, J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); see also 
dgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 111.2d 143, 85 111.Dec. 475, 478-79, 473 
E.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 909, 106 S.Ct. 278, 88 
Ed.2d 243 (1985); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 
988); Lepore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 224 N.J.Super. 463, 540 A.2d 1296, 
01 (1988), aff'd, 115 N.J. 226, 557 A.2d 1371, cert, denied, 493 U.S. 954, 110 
Ct. 366, 107 L.Ed.2d 353 (1989); cf. Johnson v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 
9 Cal.App.3d 518, 196 Cal.Rptr. 896, 899 (1983); *961 K Mart Corp. v. 
nsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364, 1369-70 (1987). 
We next turn to the UADA to determine whether it preempts Retherford's common 
w claims for discharge in violation of public policy, breach of implied 
ntract, malicious interference with contract, negligent employment, and 
tentional infliction of emotional distress. Retherford argues that the UADA 
s no preemptive effect because she hopes to avoid its provisions and pursue 
r common law remedies. 
[6] Our analysis of this question breaks down into two subsidiary issues, 
rst, does the UADA preempt common law causes of action for retaliation against 
employee for complaints of sexual harassment? Second, if the UADA does have 
is preemptive effect, do the causes of action Retherford alleges fall within 
e UADA's preemptive scope? We discuss these questions in turn. 
The starting place for a determination of the preemptive effect of the UADA 
the statute itself. The legislature enacted the UADA in 1969 as part of a 
mprehensive state labor law scheme. See 1969 Utah Laws ch. 85, §§ 160-67. As 
ssed, the statute neither prohibited employer retaliation against employees 
mplaining of discrimination nor provided that the UADA supplied the exclusive 
medy for discriminatory or prohibited employment practices. In 1985, the 
gislature added both a provision barring employer retaliation against 
ployees opposing any employment practices prohibited by the chapter, 1985 Utah 
ws ch. 189, § 3, and a provision making the UADA's remedies exclusive, id. § 
The 1985 exclusivity provision read as follows: 
The procedures contained in this section and Section 34-35-8 are the 
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination because of 
race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(11) (1988) (amended 1990 & 1991) (current version 
§ 34-35-7.1(15)). (FN5) The 1985 exclusivity provision, while listing 
ecific grounds that had been theretofore prohibited, did not mention expressly 
e newly added prohibited action: employer retaliation against employees who 
posed prohibited employment practices. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 189, § 4. In 
90, the legislature added retaliation to the listed grounds covered by the 
clusivity provision. See 1990 Utah Laws ch. 63, § 2. 
In arguing that the UADA is not the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation 
ainst employees who oppose prohibited discrimination, Retherford seizes upon 
e fact that the exclusivity provision in effect in 1986, when she was fired, 
d not expressly mention retaliation. She claims that this omission excepts 
r common law claims from the UADA's exclusivity provision. We disagree. We 
nd that taken as a whole, the plain text of the statute then in effect 
eempts common law causes of action for retaliation for complaints of 
ployment discrimination. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the 1990 
endment of the statute bolster this construction. We discuss our construction 
the statute below. 
[7] [8] As Retherford correctly notes, the word "retaliation" does not appear 
the exclusivity provision in effect at the time she was fired. She also 
rrectly notes that where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
urt will not look beyond it to divine legislative intent. See Schurtz v. BMW 
North Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Allisen v. American Legion 
st No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). However, she neglects to mention 
at we interpret a statute as a whole, not piecemeal. See Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 
12; Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991); Hansen 
Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 
2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah *962 1988); Peay v. Board of Ed. of Provo City 
hool Dist., 14 Utah 2d 63, 66, 377 P.2d 490, 492 (1962). Consequently, we 
gin by examining the statute as a whole. 
Although the exclusivity provision itself specifies only "discrimination," 
e statute as a whole defines retaliation as "discrimination," thereby 
plicitly including retaliation within the exclusivity provision. Section 
-35-6(1) (a) (i) defines retaliation as a "discriminatory or prohibited" 
ployment practice. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1) (a) (i) . One could argue that 
terpreting this provision as defining retaliation as discrimination would 
ight the importance of the words "or prohibited" in section 34-35-6(1) (a) (i) . 
wever, this argument fails in light of the fact that another section of the 
atute defines "prohibited" employment practices as nothing more than those 
pecified as discriminatory, and therefore unlawful, in Section 34-35-6." Id. 
34-35-2(7). Because sections 34-35-6(1) (a) (i) and 34-35-2(7) together define 
taliation as nothing more than a form of prohibited employment discrimination, 
taliation must fall within the section 34-35-7.1(11) direction that the UADA's 
ocedures "are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment 
scrimination." Id. § 34-35-7.1(11) (1988) (amended 1990 & 1991) (current 
rsion at § 34-35-7.1(15)). Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, 
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find that the version of the UADA in effect at the time of Retherford1s 
ring was the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against an employee who 
mplained of sexual harassment. We hold that the UADA preempts common law 
uses of action for discharge in retaliation for complaints of employment 
scrimination. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 F.Supp. 381, 386 (D.Utah 
90); cf. Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 223-24 (3d Cir.1984); 
rauss v. A.L. Randall Co., 144 Cal.App.3d 514, 194 Cal.Rptr. 520, 523 (1983). 
[9] As a final matter, we recognize that the legislature's later amendment of 
e exclusivity provision to prohibit retaliation explicitly might indicate that 
e earlier exclusivity provision had not included retaliation within its scope, 
wever, Retherford has produced no evidence that the legislature intended this 
endment to change the substantive law rather than merely to clarify it. Our 
n research into the history of this amendment has been similarly unavailing, 
sent some evidence to the contrary, we conclude that taken as a whole, the 
rsion of the UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's firing defined 
taliation as discrimination and provided the exclusive remedy for this type of 
scrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of our statutory 
ndate to construe liberally statutes in derogation of the common law. See 
ah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. 
[10] Having determined that the UADA is the exclusive remedy for a claim of 
ployer retaliation for complaints of employment discrimination, we turn to the 
estion of whether Retherford?s tort and contract claims come within the scope 
the UADA's preemptive effect. This question presents us with an apparently 
vel question in Utah: What analytical model should determine when an 
elusive statutory cause of action preempts a common law claim based on the 
me facts? Although the Code provides that courts are to construe liberally 
atutes that are in derogation of the common law, see id. § 68-3-2, and 
though we have considered that statute when examining the scope of statutorily 
eated causes of action or duties, see, e.g., Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135, 
36-37 (Utah 1988); AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 
9, 290-91 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Niblock v. Salt Lake County, 100 Utah 
3, 581-82, 111 P.2d 800, 804 (1941), we have yet to propound a generic test 
r determining when a statutory cause of action functions as the exclusive 
medy for the wrong, thereby foreclosing enforcement of either a preexisting 
mmon law remedy or a common law remedy recognized after the enactment of the 
atute. 
Because we lack an analytical model to answer this question, we have looked 
law outside our jurisdiction. Our research has revealed a diversity of 
proaches. *963 Courts have described at least three separate tests for 
termining the preemptive effect of statutes on the common law. First, in 
amining the very issue that confronts us now, the United States District Court 
r the District of Utah decided that the relevant inquiry was whether the 
mmon law cause of action was "based upon the very conduct which is necessary 
prove sexual harassment or sex discrimination under the [UADA], namely, 
nduct expressly prohibited by the Act...." Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
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. 87-O0659G, slip op. at 12, 1988 WL 217350 (D.Utah Nov. 23, 1988) 
^published). 
Second, in similar contexts, other courts have articulated a test grounded on 
at can be termed "antecedent existence." These courts hold that the 
atutory action is the exclusive remedy if the common law cause of action did 
t exist before the statutory cause of action was created. See Bernstein v. 
tna Life & Casualty, 843 F.2d 359, 365 (9th Cir.1988); Froyd v. Cook, 681 
Supp. 669, 674 (E.D.Cal.1988); Guevara v. K-Mart Corp., 629 F.Supp. 1189, 
31 (S.D.W.Va.1986); Mahoney v. Crocker Nat'1 Bank, 571 F.Supp. 287, 293 
.D.Cal.1983); Register v. Coleman, 130 Ariz. 9, 633 P.2d 418, 423 (1981); 
lley Drive-In Theatre Corp. v. Superior Court, 79 Ariz. 396, 291 P.2d 213, 215 
355); cf. Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels Corp., 634 F.Supp. 684, 688 
.Haw.1986). 
Finally, in determining the preemptive scope of workers' compensation 
atutes, courts have established a test that inquires whether the statutory 
leme supplies an indispensable element of the tort claim. See Foley v. 
laroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711, 716 (1980); Gambrell v. Kansas 
ty Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo.Ct.App.1978). We have 
Dpted this test in determining whether the Utah workers' compensation statute 
^plants common law causes of action for injuries on the job. See Mounteer v. 
ih Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). 
Because we see no reason why the indispensable element test should not apply 
the area before us as well as to workers' compensation (FN6) and because the 
ler two approaches appear to be cumbersome and indeterminate, we hold that the 
dispensable element test is the correct analytical model for determining 
Either a statutory cause of action forecloses a common law remedy. To explain 
Ls choice, we briefly outline our objections to the other two models courts 
re followed in this area. 
We begin with the federal district court's test in Davis, under which the 
3A would preempt only "those common law causes of action which are based upon 
* very conduct which is necessary to prove [a claim under the act]." Slip op. 
12. We think that this test is simply too ambiguous. First, the Davis 
irt itself seems uncertain as to precisely how the test should be applied. In 
isidering whether the UADA preempted several different claims, the court 
:iculated the standard in varying and not wholly consistent ways. At one 
Lnt, the court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for intentional or 
jligent infliction of emotional distress "because the theoretical basis [sic] 
: the two claims are separate and distinct," id. at 21, while at another, the 
irt found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for negligent supervision 
:ause it "may encompass more than acts defined to be 'discriminatory or 
)hibited employment practices' under the Utah Act," id. at 22. Second, we 
* unconvinced that inquiring whether a common law cause of action is broader 
in a statutory cause of action will result in defensible distinctions between 
)se causes of action that are preempted and those that are not. (FN7) 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Page 27 
4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
tah 1992) 
nsequently, *964 we decline to adopt the Davis test as the standard for 
termining preemption in this state. 
Similarly flawed is the test of antecedent existence, which appears most 
veloped in California. This test focuses on timing. The general rule is that 
the common law cause of action did not exist before the statutory cause of 
tion was created, the statutory cause of action preempts the common law. See 
rnstein, 843 F.2d at 365; Froyd, 681 F.Supp. at 674; Guevara, 629 F.Supp. at 
91; Mahoney, 571 F.Supp. at 293; Register, 633 P.2d at 423; Valley Drive-in 
eatre Corp., 291 P.2d at 215; Strauss, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 522-23; Gay Law 
udents Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal.3d 458, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 34, 
5 P.2d 592, 612 (1979); Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara 
unty Transit Dist., 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 135 Cal.Rptr. 192, 197 (1976). 
We reject the test of antecedent existence for two reasons. First, we are 
sure of its scope. Despite the apparently general statement of the rule, we 
rmot tell whether, in fact, the rule applies to anything other than a common 
tf claim for discharge in violation of public policy, which is the usual 
ntext in which the rule has been applied. See, e.g., Bernstein, 843 F.2d at 
2-64; Froyd, 681 F.Supp. at 673 & n. 10; Mahoney, 571 F.Supp. at 292-93; 
rauss, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 522. The few cases in which courts have addressed 
ner common law causes of action, ostensibly under the antecedent existence 
st, are so cryptic as to appear conclusory. See, e.g., Real v. Continental 
oup, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 434, 445 (N.D.Cal.1986); Diem v. City & County of San 
ancisco, 686 F.Supp. 806, 811-12 (N.D.Cal.1988). Although it is at least 
guable that the rule should not apply to such common law claims as breach of 
ntract, which generally predate state antidiscrimination statutes, we have 
and no reasoned analysis of this question. 
This uncertainty contributes to our second reason for declining to adopt the 
3t of antecedent existence. At its logical extremes, the theory of antecedent 
istence could infringe upon constitutional and statutory mandates. The United 
ates Constitution protects against state interference with contracts, see U.S. 
ist. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and the Utah Constitution's open courts provision 
stricts the extent to which the state can limit common law remedies, see Utah 
nst. art. I, § 11. If the test of antecedent existence applies to venerable 
nmon law remedies such as breach of contract or malicious interference with 
itract, it might trench upon these constitutional provisions. Conversely, if 
* test of antecedent existence is limited to claims for discharge in violation 
public policy, as suggested by a case in which the court applied the test to 
:laim of discharge in violation of public policy but failed to consider the 
3tfs possible application to the plaintiff's other common law claims, see 
rnstein, 843 F.2d at 364-66, we cannot reconcile it with Utah's statutory 
"idate to construe liberally statutes in derogation of the common law, see Utah 
ie Ann. § 68-3-2. In sum, we are reluctant to adopt a test of uncertain scope 
n^ it may pose constitutional questions at one extreme and statutory questions 
the other. 
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[11] We now turn to what we term the indispensable element test, which we 
opt as the analytical model for determining when a legislative enactment 
pplies the exclusive remedy for a certain wrong. We think that the 
dispensable element model will avoid much of the vagueness and uncertainty 
at plague the Davis test and the test of antecedent existence. The 
dispensable element test relies on neither timing nor conduct to determine 
eemption. *965 Instead, under this test, preemption depends on " fthe 
ture of the injury for which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not the nature 
the defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for 
at injury.' " Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716 (quoting Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 168). 
[12] An illustration is in order. In Mounteer, 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991), in 
ich we adopted the indispensable element test in the context of workers' 
npensation, we applied the test as follows: Initially, we identified the 
jury that the workers' compensation statute is designed to address, i.e., only 
ysical and mental injuries on the job. Id. at 1057. Then we examined the 
ements of the plaintiff's tort claims against his employer to determine 
Bther physical or mental injury was a necessary element of each cause of 
tion. Id. at 1058-59. This inquiry led us to the following conclusions, 
rst, we determined that the plaintiff's claim for slander did not require that 
5 plaintiff prove physical or mental injury; it required defamation, or 
jury to reputation, which was not an injury the statute addressed, 
nsequently, we held that the nature of the injury was not among those injuries 
Dtected by the statute and therefore the Workers' Compensation Act did not 
Dvide the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff's slander claim. Id. at 1058. 
rond, we determined that the plaintiff's claims for intentional and negligent 
fliction of emotional distress did require that the plaintiff prove mental 
jury because " 'mental harm is the essence' of [those] tort[s]." Id. 
aoting Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716); see id. at 1059. Because mental injury 
3 among those injuries addressed by the statute and because the plaintiff 
aid not prove intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 
:hout proving mental injury, we held that the Workers' Compensation Act 
Dvided the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff's mental distress. (FN8) 
[13] Applying this analysis to the case at hand, we begin with the task of 
:ermining what injuries the UADA is designed to address. This purpose is 
/ealed on the face of the Act itself, which provides that it is a 
scriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to discharge, demote, 
terminate any person, or to retaliate against, or discriminate in matters of 
compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions *966 of employment 
against any person otherwise qualified, because of race, color, sex, age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1) (a) (I) (amended 1989). From this language, we 
fer that the legislature intended the UADA to address all manner of employment 
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scrimination against any member of the specified protected groups. As 
scussed above, the legislature included employer retaliation for complaining 
employment discrimination within its definition of discrimination. Thus, the 
xt step in our analysis requires us to determine whether employment 
scrimination, including employer retaliation, supplies an indispensable 
ement of any of Retherford's causes of action. 
[14] [15] We begin with Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of 
blic policy. In order to prove this tort, Retherford must show that AT & T 
scharged her in a manner or for a reason that contravened a "clear and 
bstantial public policy" of the State of Utah, a public policy rooted in 
ahfs constitution or statutes. (FN9) Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281; see also 
rube, 111 P.2d at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). The only 
ssible source in Utah's statutes or constitution for a clear and substantial 
blic policy allegedly violated by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's 
ohibition of retaliation for good faith complaints of employment 
scrimination. (FN10) See Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15). Without deciding that 
e statute at issue rises to the level of a clear and substantial public 
licy, we find that in the absence of this public policy declaration, 
therford would be unable even to allege an action for this tort. Simply put, 
there were no UADA policy against retaliation, there could be no tort for 
scharge in violation of this public policy. Applying the Mounteer test, it is 
ain that the harm the UADA addresses is an indispensable element in 
therford's tort cause of action; therefore, the UADA must preempt this claim. 
Moving to Retherford's other common law causes of action, the Mounteer 
alytical model leads to the conclusion that the UADA does not preempt these 
her causes of action because discrimination is not an indispensable element of 
ase claims. A more detailed discussion of the elements of each of these 
aims is included in the analysis of the federal labor law preemption issue 
scussed below; however, for the purposes of determining the state law 
eemption question, it is enough to lay out the indispensable elements of 
therford's remaining claims and to note that none of them comprehends an 
jury that is the target of the UADA. 
*967 [16] [17] [18] [19] The elements of Retherford's claims are as follows: 
prevail on a claim of breach of implied contract, Retherford must prove the 
istence of an implied contract, created by mutual assent, and AT & T's failure 
comply with its terms. (FN11) See Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 
3, 670 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483, 
5-86 (Utah 1989); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1044-45; Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area 
nmunity Action Program, lib P.2d 940, 942-43 (Utah Ct.App.1989), cert, denied, 
9 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). To prevail on her claim of intentional infliction of 
Dtional distress, Retherford must prove that her co-workers either 
tentionally or recklessly engaged in intolerable and outrageous conduct that 
jsed her severe emotional distress. See Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 
3 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah 
.App.1990). To prevail on her claim of malicious interference with 
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ltractual relations, Retherford must prove that her co-workers, whether 
:arately or in conspiracy, intentionally and improperly persuaded AT & T to 
*ach its implied employment contract with Retherford. (FN12) See Leigh 
cniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982); Bunnell v. 
lis, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597, 602 (1962). And to prevail on her claim 
negligent employment, Retherford must prove that AT & T's negligence in 
ring, supervising, or retaining its employees proximately caused her harm. 
3 Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 51-52, 386 P.2d 910, 911-12 (1963) 
Noticeably absent from this list of the indispensable elements of the four 
aims is an injury that is a target of the UADA: retaliation for complaints of 
cual harassment. While it is true that all four claims arise out of 
zendants' retaliatory conduct, preemption depends on the nature of the injury, 
: on the nature of the conduct allegedly responsible for that harm. See 
ley, 413 N.E.2d at 716. The injuries Retherford alleges--the broken promise, 
3 mental anguish, the wrongful interference with her contract, and the 
:hecked misconduct of her fellow employees--are distinct from the injury of 
:aliation. Because Retherford would be able to maintain these claims without 
Leging retaliatory harassment, we hold that under the Mounteer test, the UADA 
3S not preempt Retherford's claims for breach of implied contract, intentional 
zliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with contract, and 
jligent employment. 
Having determined that the UADA preempts only Retherford's claim for 
scharge in violation of public policy, we next address whether federal labor 
\i *968 preempts any of Retherford's remaining causes of action. We recap 
5 substance of these remaining claims. Retherford alleges that, first, AT & 
3 failure to prevent retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment 
cached a contract implied from AT & T's code of conduct; second, Gailey, 
idall, Johnson, and Bateson-Hough maliciously interfered with her contractual 
Lations, resulting in AT & T's breach of its implied contract prohibiting 
Drisal for good-faith complaints of sexual harassment; third, Gailey, 
idall, Johnson, and Bateson-Hough intentionally inflicted emotional distress 
her through their retaliatory conduct; and fourth, AT & T negligently 
cloyed Retherford's harassers, thereby allowing them to inflict emotional 
stress on her. 
The legislative enactment that determines the federal preemption question is 
:tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), which reads as 
Llows: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this 
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district 
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without 
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of 
the parties. 
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Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 
ereinafter section 301]. 
On its face, it is not apparent that section 301 preempts state law. Allis-
almers Corp. v. Lueck, All U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 
985). However, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted section 301 as 
t only providing federal jurisdiction over controversies involving collective 
rgaining agreements, but also as vesting exclusive power in "federal courts to 
shion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining 
reements." Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 
3, 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, 915, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); accord All is-Chalmers Corp., 
1 U.S. at 210, 105 S.Ct. at 1910; Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
rehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04, 82 S.Ct. 
1, 577, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962); see also Sperver v. Galigher Ash Co., 1'47 P.2d 
25, 1027 (Utah 1987). 
The policy underlying this expansive interpretation of section 301 is well-
jnded. If the terms of collective bargaining agreements were subject to 
ffering interpretations by state and federal courts, it could severely disrupt 
th the negotiation and the administration of collective bargaining agreements. 
cas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 103, 82 S.Ct. at 576. To avoid this possibility, 
2 Court held that the meaning to be given to the terms of collective 
rgaining agreements must be determined exclusively by uniform federal law. 
. at 103-04, 82 S.Ct. at 577; see Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210, 105 
:t. at 1910. 
[20] An elaboration on this doctrine of federal exclusivity in the 
:erpretation of collective bargaining agreements is the Supreme Court's 
iclusion that section 301 preempts any common law cause of action where the 
Lai court, in adjudicating that cause of action, must interpret the terms of a 
Llective bargaining agreement. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 
5 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). In essence, 
B Supreme Court has held that section 301 preempts any common law claim that 
" 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement,' 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2431, 96 
Ld.2d 318 (1987) (quoting International Bhd. of Electric Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
zhler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 2167 n. 3, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 
987)), lest the common law provide a vehicle for state courts to intrude into 
B exclusive federal preserve that is the interpretation of collective 
rgaining agreements. The justification for this expansive view of section 301 
semption is the ease with which an aggrieved employee otherwise could turn a 
Lt for breach of a collective bargaining agreement into a state tort or 
itract claim, thereby obtaining *969 a state law holding that might result 
an inconsistent interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. As 
5 Court has explained: 
The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that 
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labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require 
that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform 
federal interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a 
labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow 
from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform 
federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach 
of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result would 
elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 
301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of 
contract. 
Allis-Chalmers Corp., All U.S. at 211, 105 S.Ct. at 1911. 
[21] The question before us, then, is whether resolution of the state law 
aim depends upon the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 
it does, section 301 preempts the state law cause of action. Lingle, 486 
3. at 405-06, 108 S.Ct. at 1881. However, "even if dispute resolution 
rsuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, 
the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long 
the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement 
self, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption 
eposes." Id. at 409-10, 108 S.Ct. at 1883. Under such circumstances, there 
no section 301 preemption. 
[22] Defendants argue that the Lingle test bars Retherford1s claims of breach 
implied contract, tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction 
emotional distress, and negligent employment because evaluation of the state 
aims is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor 
itract." In order to determine whether resolution of Retherford's claims 
deed depends upon the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement, we must 
amine the discrete elements of each claim. See Douglas v. American Info, 
-hnologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 570 (7th Cir.1989). 
We first address Retherford's claim for breach of implied contract, 
fendants argue that section 301 bars Retherford's implied contract claim 
:ause the state court must interpret the collective bargaining agreement in 
ier to determine whether the AT & T code of conduct upon which the claim is 
sed is separate from or subsumed into the collective bargaining agreement. We 
Ld that Retherfordfs implied contract claim is inactionable, but on somewhat 
fferent grounds. See Hill v. Seattle First Nat1! Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 
:ah 1992). 
Under federal labor law, only duly authorized union representatives can 
:gain for the terms and conditions of employment for those within the 
-gaining unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); cf. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 
7, 107 S.Ct. at 2432. The Supreme Court has held that although any employee 
group of employees can reach a separate agreement with the employer, that 
Darate contract must be consistent with the collective bargaining agreement 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Page 33 
1 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
:ah 1992) 
jotiated by the union. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339, 64 S.Ct. 
5, 581, 88 L.Ed. 762 (1944); see also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 
3. 175, 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2006, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123, reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 892, 
S.Ct. 13, 19 L.Ed.2d 202 (1967). Thus, inconsistent separate agreements are 
: enforceable. See Eitmann v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 362 
:h Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 433, 83 L.Ed.2d 359 (1984). 
In applying this rule, at least two federal circuits have found unenforceable 
Darate agreements that were more favorable to the individual employees than 
5 collective bargaining agreement. See Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 
3 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th Cir.1989); Eitmann, 730 F.2d at 362-63. For 
ample, the Ninth Circuit has held that an employee whose collective *970 
rgaining agreement defined his tenure as at-will could not enforce an implied 
itract for just-cause dismissal because the extra protections would contradict 
* collective bargaining agreement. See Chmiel, 873 F.2d at 1285. 
We think that the policy underlying these decisions is sound. Nothing could 
iermine the authority of the collective bargaining unit more thoroughly than 
Lowing individuals or cohorts of employees to enforce separate contracts that 
:e more advantageous to those employees than was the collective bargaining 
reement itself. Although the interests of individual employees may be 
Lghted in the process, Congress apparently is of the view that such sacrifices 
i necessary in order to match the power of the employer with the aggregate 
\/er of unionized employees. Cf. Lodge 16, Int1! Ass'n of Machinists & 
cospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations CommTn, 427 U.S. 
>, 146, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 2556, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 
] U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. at 2006; J.I. Case, 321 U.S. at 338-39, 64 S.Ct. at 
L. See generally Annotation, Collective Bargaining Under Labor Relations Act 
Related to Freedom of Contract Between Employer and Individual Employees, 88 
Cd. 770 (1944). Accordingly, we decline to upset this balance by allowing 
iividual agreements to undercut the union as the bargaining agent. In the 
stant case, providing any remedy under an implied contract when no remedy is 
lilable under the collective bargaining agreement--because the time for 
titration has passed--obviously would put Retherford in a more advantageous 
sition than AT & T employees bound by the collective bargaining agreement, 
^reby undermining the collective bargaining unit. Consequently, Retherford's 
.eged implied contract is unenforceable. 
[23] Our holding that Retherford's implied contract is invalid requires us to 
id that her claim for malicious interference with contract is similarly 
iective. Although some courts have held that the contract at issue in a case 
: malicious interference need not be enforceable, courts generally agree that 
i contract must not be illegal or contrary to public policy. See generally 45 
,Jur.2d Interference §§ 8-9 (1969 & Supp.1992). Allowing a plaintiff to sue 
: malicious interference with a contract that is invalid would gut the federal 
.icy of consolidating bargaining power in union representatives, 
lsequently, we affirm the summary judgment on Retherford's claim for malicious 
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terference with contract, albeit on grounds different from those relied upon 
the trial court. 
[24] Having determined that the LMRA bars Retherford1s claims stemming from 
r implied contract, we next consider her tort claims for intentional 
fliction of emotional distress and negligent employment. We begin with her 
aim for emotional distress because AT & T can be held liable for negligent 
ployment only if its employees Randall, Johnson, Gailey, (FN13) and Bateson-
ugh are liable for an independent tort. See Focke v. United States, 597 
Supp. 1325, 1344 (D.Kan.1982); Mulhem v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 
9 P.2d 15, 18 (Ct.App.1990). See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 
3 (1958). Here, Retherford alleges that AT & T's employees committed the tort 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
[25] To sustain her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
therford must show that (i) Gailey1s, Randall's, Johnson's, and Bateson-
ugh's conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the 
nerally accepted standards of decency and morality; (ii) they intended to 
use, or acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional 
71 distress; (iii) Retherford suffered severe emotional distress; and (iv) 
eir conduct proximately caused Retherford's emotional distress. See Samms v. 
cles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961); White v. Blackburn, 
7 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah Ct.App.1990) . To decide whether this tort claim is 
eempted, we must determine whether, on the record before us, there is any 
sis for concluding that defendants' conduct alleged to provide a basis for the 
rt claim might reasonably implicate any of the terms of the collective 
rgaining agreement. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06, 108 S.Ct. at 1881. 
A necessary element of Retherford's claim is that Bateson-Hough's, Gailey's, 
ndall's, and Johnson's behavior was outrageous and intolerable in that it 
fended against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. See 
mms, 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347. Before analyzing this tort under 
a test for section 301 preemption, it is helpful to identify the conduct that 
therford alleges. Retherford details the conduct of each co-worker as 
ilows: With respect to Bateson-Hough, Retherford contends that Bateson-Hough 
sponded to her complaining of sexual harassment by requiring her to sit next 
Gailey, telling her she had a letter sanctioning her and Gailey, assigning 
r to certain "slow" work stations that hampered her productivity, reprimanding 
d criticizing her, and threatening to fire her if she continued to complain 
out Gailey. 
As for Gailey, Retherford alleges that Gailey avenged Retherford's complaint 
the AT & T EEO coordinator by following her, making threatening faces at her, 
d speeding by her late at night when she was trying to cross the street. (FN14 
As for Randall, Retherford charges that Randall told her she must report to 
ise within ten days or lose her job. In addition, although the record is 
Diguous, Randall may have been among Gailey's friends who retaliated against 
therford by staring at her, making "threatening facial expressions" at her, 
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Iking extremely close to her, and following her around the office. Finally, 
hnson also may have been among the group of Gaileyfs friends who discomfited 
therford by their staring and their threatening facial expressions. The 
cord shows that on at least one occasion, Johnson accused Retherford of 
aring at her. Retherford also alleges that in her presence, Johnson and 
hers lamented the fact that someone was watching them and would report them if 
ey broke company rules. After one such comment, Johnson looked at Retherford 
d said, "Isn't that right, Debi?" Viewing the facts in the light most 
\/orable to Retherford, as we must, see Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 
58 (Utah 1991), we accept for the purposes of this appeal that Retherford has 
leged at least that Randall and Johnson made a habit of following her and 
eking her after she complained of Gailey's sexual harassment. 
Defendants argue that section 301 preempts Retherford's claims of intentional 
fliction of emotional distress because a court deciding whether this conduct 
s intolerable and outrageous must interpret the collective bargaining 
reement to determine whether Bateson-Hough exceeded her supervisory authority 
d whether Gailey's, Randall's, and Johnson's work-place conduct was improper. 
agree in part. 
[26] In considering section 301 preemption of tort claims alleging infliction 
emotional distress by a supervisor or fellow employee, courts seem to have 
stinguished between situations in which the defendant has misused his or her 
thority under a collective bargaining agreement to torment the plaintiff and 
buations in which the defendant has inflicted the distress through conduct 
at is purely personal and does not implicate the exercise of supervisory 
thority. See Paradis v. United Technologies Pratt & Whitney Div., 672 F.Supp. 
, 71 (D.Conn.1987) . Compare Douglas, 877 F.2d at 571-72 and Newberry v. 
cific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir.1988) and Truex v. Garrett 
eightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (9th Cir.1985) with *972 Keehr v. 
nsolidated Freightways of Delaware, Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 136-38 (7th Cir.1987) 
d Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536, 539-40 (9th Cir.), cert, 
nied, 484 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 251, 98 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) and Garibaldi v. 
cky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1369 n. 4 (9th Cir.1984), cert, denied, 
1 U.S. 1099, 105 S.Ct. 2319, 85 L.Ed.2d 839 (1985). 
The Douglas and Keehr cases, both from the Seventh Circuit, illustrate this 
stinction. In Douglas, the plaintiff charged her employer with "extreme and 
:rageous" treatment because of the employer's allegedly arbitrary denials of 
c requests for days off, an "unjustified" final warning, and "unwarranted and 
^essive" scrutiny of her work. 877 F.2d at 572. The Seventh Circuit 
icluded that a state court would have to interpret the collective bargaining 
reement's provisions regulating the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's 
Dloyment to determine whether the employer's actions were indeed arbitrary, 
justified, unwarranted, and excessive. It therefore held that section 301 
cred Douglas's state tort claim. Id. at 572-73. 
In contrast, the Keehr court found that section 301 did not preempt a claim 
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r intentional infliction of emotional distress. There, Keehr complained that 
company supervisor had engaged him in an altercation during which the 
oervisor allegedly made outrageous comments about the sexual activities of 
Bhr's wife, and the verbal abuse escalated into a fist fight. 825 F.2d at 
5. The court reasoned that there was no section 301 preemption because the 
oervisor's abuse of the employee could not reasonably be seen as implicating 
s supervisor's authority under the collective bargaining agreement, even 
Dugh it would have been possible for Keehr to file a grievance against his 
Dervisor for using abusive language. Id. at 137-38. 
We find that this distinction has merit and apply it to Retherford's 
Dtional distress claim. Retherford's allegations that Randall ordered her to 
Dort to Boise within ten days or lose her job and that Bateson-Hough 
Drimanded Retherford, warned her to stop complaining, told her where to sit, 
i assigned her certain tasks raise questions about their respective authority 
ier the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, to the extent that this 
iduct constitutes a ground for the claim of intentional infliction of 
Dtional distress, section 301 preempts Retherford's cause of action. 
However, other allegations regarding the conduct of Gailey, Randall, and 
mson can withstand the section 301 preemption analysis. Specifically, 
:herford alleges that Gailey responded to Retherford's complaint to the AT & T 
) coordinator with conduct ranging from following her around the office to 
:empting to frighten her as she crossed the street. She alleges that Randall 
i Johnson retaliated by following her and making threatening faces at her. 
:h alleged behavior raises issues of purely personal misconduct. Evaluating 
* severity and the consequences of this conduct in order to adjudicate 
:herford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress should 
juire no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. These 
Legations are analogous to those in Keehr, not to those in Douglas. To the 
:ent that Retherford's tort claim is premised upon allegations of purely 
rsonal misconduct, as opposed to misconduct under color of possible 
ltractual authority, section 301 does not preempt the cause of action. 
[27] Having determined that Gailey, Johnson, and Randall may be held liable 
: the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without implicating 
i collective bargaining agreement, we turn to the question of whether 
:herford can hold AT & T liable for Gailey's, Johnson's, and Randall's 
lavior under a theory of negligent employment without running afoul of section 
. preemption. The issue is whether, in determining AT & T's liability under 
_s claim, a court could avoid determining any issue that would implicate the 
.lective bargaining agreement. 
[28] Negligent employment is a tort of some novelty in Utah. Although we 
re recognized this cause of action, see Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 
2d 1037, *973 1048 (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 
>9 (Utah 1989), Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 51, 386 P.2d 910, 
.-12 (1963), our cases do not describe its elements in detail. Consequently, 
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look to other jurisdictions to provide a detailed description of this tort. 
prevail on her claim of negligent employment against AT & T, Retherford must 
3w that (i) AT & T knew or should have known that its employees posed a 
reseeable risk of retaliatory harassment to third parties, including fellow 
Dloyees; (ii) the employees did indeed inflict such harm; and (iii) the 
Dloyer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining the employees 
Dximately caused the injury. (FN15) See, e.g., Pruitt v. Ravelin, 141 Ariz. 
5, 685 P.2d 1347, 1354-55 (Ct.App.1984); Kassman v. Busfield Enters., Inc., 
L Ariz. 163, 639 P.2d 353, 356-57 (Ct.App.1981); Najera v. Southern Pac. 
. , 191 Cal.App.2d 634, 13 Cal.Rptr. 146, 149 & n. 3 (1961); Destefano v. 
abrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287-88 (Colo.1988); Tatham v. Wabash R.R., 412 111. 
3, 107 N.E.2d 735, 739 (1952); Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 
I P.2d 653, 662 (1984); LaBonte v. National Gypsum Co., 113 N.H. 678, 313 
2d 403, 405 (1973); F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 594 P.2d 745, 746-49 
379); Valdez v. Warner, 106 N.M. 305, 742.P.2d 517, 519-20 (Ct.App.), cert, 
ished sub nom. Z & E, Inc. v. Valdez, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d 1058 (1987); 
ttard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 688 P.2d 333, 339-41 
:.App.), writ quashed, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984); Kelley v. Oregon 
ipbuilding Corp., 183 Or. 1, 189 P.2d 105, 106-07 (1948); Chesterman v. 
rmon, 82 Or.App. 1, 727 P.2d 130, 131-32, aff'd and remanded, 305 Or. 439, 753 
M 404 (1988); Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 246 A.2d 418, 
3-22 (1968); Banks v. Nordstrom, Inc., 57 Wash.App. 251, 787 P.2d 953, 960 
390) . See generally Kenneth R. Wallentine, Negligent Hiring: The Dual Sting 
Pre-Employment Investigation, Utah Bar Journal, October 1989, at 15; Donald 
Armstrong, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: The Case Against 
zlusion, 52 Or.L.Rev. 296, 298-300 (1973); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 
3 (1958); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (1965). 
For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume that Retherford can prove 
it Gailey, Randall, and Johnson intentionally inflicted emotional distress 
)n her. Also we note that because the tort of negligent employment can impose 
ability on the employer even when the employer would not otherwise be liable 
ier the doctrine of respondeat superior, we have no need to consult the 
Llective bargaining agreement to determine whether Gailey, Randall, and 
inson were acting in the scope of their employment. See Clover, 808 P.2d at 
18; Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1059. 
Defendants argue that a state court cannot determine the elements of the 
;t--i.e., that AT & T knew or reasonably should have known that Gailey, 
idall, and Johnson posed a hazard of such tortious conduct and could have 
cen steps to avoid this hazard--without referring to any provision of the 
.lective bargaining agreement. Defendants insist that the court will have to 
sort to the collective bargaining agreement's termination and discipline 
)visions to determine whether *974 AT & T acted "appropriately" in dealing 
:h Gailey, Johnson, and Randall. We cannot agree that the record before us 
ces clear that the trial court must resort to the collective bargaining 
reement to adjudicate this claim. 
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[29] In analyzing this issue, we first note that AT & T misunderstands the 
arce of its duty to control the conduct of its employees. AT & T suggests 
it this obligation arises from the collective bargaining agreement. This is 
:orrect. The employer's duty toward those people whom its employees place in 
position of reasonably foreseeable risk or injury does not stem from its 
Lvate employment contract. Cf. Valdez, 742 P.2d at 519. Instead, it is a 
:y imposed by the common law of the state. The common law of tort expresses 
)lic policy, the scope of which is not generally determined by reference to 
.vately contracted obligations. Certainly, we may vindicate some public 
.icies by implying them as covenants to private contracts. See, e.g., Beck v. 
risers Ins. Exch. , 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). However, such covenants are 
licial creations that express public policy and constitute public law; they 
\ not private agreements between private parties, and they are not avoidable 
contract. See id. at 801 n. 4. 
In the present case, the duty that Retherford relies upon arises from the 
>lic law of tort, not from the private collective bargaining agreement, 
irefore, the existence of the duty and the determination of its scope do not 
[uire resort to any term of the collective bargaining agreement. Other duties 
[ht be due to Retherford and other employees'by reason of the collective 
•gaining agreement, but their existence is not relevant to the duty inquiry 
purposes of the tort of negligent employment. 
It is true, however, that in an action for negligent employment, the 
intiff must show that the employer's failure to fulfill the duty owed the 
ured party in hiring, supervising, or retaining the malfeasing employee 
ximately caused the injury of which the plaintiff complains. In making this 
tual determination, a court might have to resort to the collective bargaining 
eement to discover whether contractual limitations on the power of the 
loyer to deal with the employee precluded it from taking steps to prevent the 
m. Although such an eventuality might raise questions of section 301 
emption, the defendants in the present case have made no showing that the 
al court, in adjudicating this particular matter, would have to refer to the 
lective bargaining agreement to determine whether AT & T could have prevented 
ley's, Johnson's, and Randall's allegedly tortious acts. It is not enough 
t we might imagine a situation where a court might have to make such a 
erence. There must be a realistic possibility that it may occur. Because 
endants have not shown any such realistic possibility, we hold that there is 
section 301 preemption of the claim for negligent employment. (FN16) 
To summarize the preemptive effects of state and federal statutes on 
herford's claims, the UADA preempts only Retherford's claim for discharge in 
lation of public policy, while the LMRA preempts Retherford's claims for 
ach of implied contract and malicious interference with contract and 
tially preempts her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
therefore affirm the trial court's summary judgment against Retherford on 
se preempted claims. The only claims to survive state and federal preemption 
Retherford's claim for negligent employment and the part of her emotional 
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stress claim that alleges purely personal misconduct on the part of Gailey, 
mson, and Randall. 
We now examine defendants' objections to Retherford's nonpreempted causes of 
:ion *975 for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent 
)loyment. First, defendants argue that Retherford's claims of negligent 
)loyment and intentional infliction of emotional distress are untimely. 
:ond, they argue that the conduct alleged is insufficient as a matter of law 
support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
discuss these arguments in turn. 
Defendants base their untimeliness contention on section 78-12-25 (3) 's four-
ir period of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). Defendants argue 
it the four years began to run May 10, 1984, when Retherford's submission of a 
.tten complaint to the AT & T EEO coordinator first indicated that she thought 
j was being harassed. Because more than four years had elapsed by April 7, 
:9, when Retherford filed her state action, defendants claim that she failed 
file her claims of negligent employment and intentional infliction of 
>tional distress in a timely manner. We disagree. 
[30] The question presented is whether, taking the facts in a light most 
-orable to Retherford, the statute of limitations ran before April 7, 1989. 
:endants contend that as a matter of law, the statute began to run at the time 
the first complaint. Under Utah law, the statute of limitations begins to 
. when the cause of action accrues. See id. § 78-12-1; Davidson Lumber 
es, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). A tort cause 
action accrues when all its elements come into being and the claim is 
ionable. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc., 794 P.2d at 19; see State Tax Comm'n 
Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 181, 100 P.2d 575, 577 (1940). In order to 
ermine when the limitations period began to run, then, we must determine when 
h of the causes of action became actionable in the courts. 
[31] We begin with Retherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
tress. Because of the nature of this cause of action, it can be difficult to 
ermine when all its elements—intentional, outrageous conduct proximately 
sing extreme distress—have come into being. Of particular difficulty is the 
ment of injury—extreme emotional distress. Sometimes, to be sure, a single 
rageous incident, such as an egregiously vicious practical joke, see 
tatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1965), results in immediate 
easily identifiable emotional distress. Often, however, emotional distress 
s not so much occur as unfold—for example, where a defendant subjects a 
intiff, not to a single outrageous act, but to a pattern or practice of acts 
erable by themselves though clearly intolerable in the aggregate. 
[32] Here, Retherford alleges a pattern of retaliatory harassment. Such 
terns present courts with the difficult task of identifying when during a 
ies of related acts the element of emotional distress "occurred." We have 
n unable to locate authority that is directly on point concerning the 
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plication of statutes of limitation to a pattern of conduct that constitutes, 
the aggregate, intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, we 
id the treatment of claims of alienation of affections instructive in this 
jard. In adjudicating such claims, which often allege a series of wrongful 
:s over a substantial period of time, courts have determined that the statute 
limitations begins to run when the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when 
re and affection are finally lost. See e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 244 Ark. 327, 
1 S.W.2d 871, 874 (1968); Dobrient v. Ciskowski, 54 Wis.2d 419, 195 N.W.2d 
), 451 (1972); see also Flink v. Simpson, 49 Wash.2d 639, 305 P.2d 803, 804 
)57); Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wash.App. 13, 510 P.2d 250, 254 (1973). Applying 
_s standard by analogy, we hold that the statute of limitations for 
:entional infliction of emotional distress does not begin to run until the 
stress is actually inflicted, i.e., when the plaintiff suffers severe 
)tional disturbance. 
[33] Although easy to describe, this standard is difficult to apply, 
:ticularly because the element of emotional distress is specific to the 
tintiff in each case. Because the tort of intentional infliction of *976 
)tional distress requires actual emotional distress, see Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 46(1) (1965), this element is to be gauged subjectively. (FN17) A 
"ticularly hardy or calloused plaintiff may never accrue a cause of action for 
.entional infliction of emotional distress, even though he or she is subjected 
outrageous conduct that no reasonable person could be expected to bear, 
.sequently, our task is to determine when, given these allegations, Retherford 
>erienced severe emotional distress, not when an ordinarily sensitive person 
Id have experienced such suffering. 
The record before us identifies this moment. (FN18) In September of 1985, 
er almost eighteen months of retaliatory abuse by her co-workers, during 
ch she repeatedly sought assistance from her immediate supervisors, the AT & 
EO coordinator, and the EEOC, Retherford took medical disability leave at the 
tance of her psychiatrist. She never returned to her job because, physically 
emotionally, she could not work in proximity to "the people who started the 
ic in her." Retherford's dramatic steps of taking leave from her job, 
king medical and psychiatric attention to heal the stresses of her work 
ce, and remaining on leave for approximately six months because she could not 
ng herself to face her harassers all support a factual inference that the 
ment of extreme emotional distress did not come into existence before 
tember of 1985. *977 This is sufficient to support the conclusion that the 
tute had not run by April of 1989, when the action was filed. 
Of course, at trial defendants will have the opportunity to prove to the 
isfaction of the finder of fact that the element of extreme emotional 
tress accrued some time before Retherford1s leave of absence. However, on 
facts before us, we cannot say as a matter of law that it accrued before 
il of 1985. Consequently, the four-year statute of limitations poses no bar 
Retherford's recovery for defendants' entire course of conduct. See Utah 
a Ann. § 78-12-25(3). 
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[34] The next question is whether Retherford1s claim for negligent employment 
so was filed within the four-year statute of limitations. Before an employer 
i be found liable for negligent employment, one of its employees must have 
umitted a tort. See Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 799 P.2d 
, 18 (Ct.App-1990); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 cmt. a (1958). 
as, as a general matter, the statute of limitations will not begin to run on a 
ase of action for negligent employment until all elements of the employee's 
:t are present. However, although the tort of negligent employment requires 
3 employee's tort as a condition precedent, we note that in situations where 
3 victim does not accrue a cause of action until she or he suffers a 
)jective harm, it may be contended that the employer's breach of duty has 
:ome evident long before that point, i.e., that the conduct element of the 
:t, the employee malfeasance, has become sufficiently apparent that the 
)loyer should have taken steps to correct it, even before the victim has fully 
:rued a cause of action. As a consequence, one might argue that the statute 
limitations against the employer for negligent employment should begin to run 
:ore the statute begins to run on the tort by the employee. Such a situation 
fht exist where, as here, the victim alleges intentional infliction of 
)tional distress. 
We need not decide today whether such an argument has merit or whether it 
)lies to the facts of this case. Defendants did not advance the argument 
:ore this court or the trial court, we have found no legal authority that 
taks to the issue, and most important, the record provides no basis for our 
.eluding as a matter of law that if the cause of action against AT & T for 
"ligent supervision did accrue before the cause of action against the 
•loyees, all this occurred before April of 1985. There is therefore no basis 
• sustaining a summary judgment on the ground that the four-year statute of 
.itations bars the negligent employment claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 
12-25(3). 
[35] [36] As a final objection to Retherford's claim of intentional 
liction of emotional distress against Randall and Johnson, defendants argue 
t the conduct alleged is insufficiently outrageous and intolerable to support 
h a claim. We disagree. The standard Utah has adopted for determining 
ther the conduct of a defendant is sufficiently offensive to permit recovery 
whether the defendant's actions "offend against the generally accepted 
ndards of decency and morality." (FN19) *978 Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 
, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961). 
Applying this standard to the facts at bar and viewing those facts in a light 
t favorable to plaintiff, we can say as a matter of law that Retherford has 
eged outrageous and intolerable conduct sufficient to support a cause of 
ion for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Certainly, as 
endants claim, merely following or making faces at someone, without more, 
s not constitute conduct of such objective offensiveness that it can give 
a to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, 
herford alleges more than simple insult or annoyance. She alleges months of 
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rsecution by her co-workers, during which Gailey, Johnson, and Randall 
adowed her movements, intimidated her with threatening looks and remarks, and 
nipulated circumstances at her work in ways that made her job markedly more 
ressful, all in retaliation for her good-faith complaint of sexual harassment, 
dulging all inferences in favor of Retherford, as we must, Rollins v. 
tersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991), such allegations are sufficient to 
tisfy the objective conduct requirement of the tort of intentional infliction 
emotional distress. 
It is worth stating forcefully that any other conclusion would amount to an 
:olerable refusal to recognize that our society has ceased seeing sexual 
cassment in the work place as a playful inevitability that should be taken in 
Dd spirits and has awakened to the fact that sexual harassment has a corrosive 
feet on those who engage in it as well as those who are subjected to it and 
at such harassment has far more to do with the abusive exercise of one 
rson's power over another than it does with sex. See, e.g., Louise F. 
:zgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure of Reason in the Clarence Thomas 
wrings, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1399, 1399 (1992); Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman 
i the Ordinary Man, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1411, 1415 (1992). This consensus extends 
:o all sectors of our society. Indeed, although Utah Senator Orrin Hatch 
rer wavered from his conviction that law professor Anita Hill had fabricated 
: allegations that Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually harassed 
:, he reportedly condemned the alleged conduct in the strongest terms, 
leone who would make such vulgar and degrading comments "would not be a normal 
:son," Senator Hatch said. "That person ... would be a psychopathic sex fiend 
a pervert." Fitzgerald at 1405. 
[37] As Senator Hatch recognized, sexual harassment is simply unacceptable in 
lay's society. To refuse to label the retaliatory conduct alleged here as 
:rageous and intolerable would be a travesty. Prosser and Keeton quite 
>perly call sexual harassment on the job "undoubtedly an intentional 
:liction of emotional distress." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on 
? Law of Torts § 12, at 18 (Supp.1988). By this, we take them to mean that 
t conduct generally labeled sexual harassment is outrageous and intolerable 
[, when performed with the requisite intent, satisfies the elements of the 
•t of intentional infliction of emotional distress. If the conduct that 
.stitutes sexual harassment is per se outrageous and intolerable, it stands to 
son that retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment must also be 
sidered outrageous and intolerable. Retherford has stated a claim for *979. 
entional infliction of emotional distress through retaliatory harassment, 
reby meriting the opportunity to establish all the elements of this tort 
ore the finder of fact. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
the nonpreempted portion of that claim. 
In sum, we hold as follows: First, both employees covered by just-cause 
loyment contracts and employees who are at-will can assert a claim in tort 
discharge in violation of public policy; second, the UADA preempts only 
herford's claim for discharge in violation of public policy; third, the LMRA 
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eempts Retherford's claims for breach of implied contract and malicious 
terference with contract, and partially preempts her claim for intentional 
fliction of emotional distress; fourth, the statute of limitations does not 
r Retherford's claim for negligent employment and the nonpreempted portion of 
r claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and fifth, 
therford has stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
nsequently, we affirm the summary judgment in part, reverse in part, and 
nand for disposition consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (concurring with reservation). 
I concur in the majority opinion with the following reservation: 
I would not reach the question whether Retherford can pursue a tort action 
: discharge in violation of public policy and also a claim for breach of her 
Llective bargaining agreement's just-cause provision. It is not necessary to 
solve this issue because assuming such tort cause of action exists, it is 
tempted by UADA, as explained in the majority opinion. 
The majority holds that Retherford could pursue both a tort action and a 
itract claim, except for the preemption. Not only would this be duplicative, 
least in part, but it possibly may violate the collective bargaining 
:eement, which requires that all grievances arising out of or resulting from 
> dismissal of a regular employee must be arbitrated. I therefore prefer to 
;erve judgment on this issue. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
.. Retherford originally named Gailey as a defendant in this suit, but 
dismissed her when Gailey declared bankruptcy. 
. The EEOC, or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, is a federal agency 
charged with administering complaints under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
. AT & T also argued that Bateson-Hough could not be liable for interference 
with contractual relations between Retherford and AT & T because she was an 
agent of one of the contracting parties and that Retherford's pleadings 
failed to state a claim that Johnson and Randall had interfered with 
contractual relations. Because of the result we reach in this case, we have 
no cause to address these issues. 
. Such a blanket statement provides us with no guidance as to the trial 
court's reasoning. It therefore does not comply with rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires trial judges to issue brief written 
statements of their grounds for granting summary judgment when multiple 
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grounds are presented. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). Although failure to issue a 
statement of grounds is not reversible error absent unusual circumstances, we 
take this opportunity to remind trial judges that the presumption of 
correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings "has little operative 
effect when members of this court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning 
because of the cryptic nature of its ruling." Allen v. Prudential Property & 
Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992). 
5. The exclusivity provision now reads, "The procedures contained in this 
section are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, relation, national origin, 
or handicap." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (Supp.1992). 
5. In fact, we have employed a similar analysis in the area of governmental 
immunities. See Gillman v. Department of Fin. Insts., 782 P. 2d 506, 511-12 
(Utah 1989) . 
]
. The Davis court's analysis of a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress caused by sexual harassment highlights this uncertainty. 
The court found that the UADA did not preempt the claim because it went 
"beyond the discriminatory conduct prohibited by the Utah Act." Davis, slip 
op. at 17. Apparently, the court believed that the extra element of outrage 
made the tort broader than the statutory claim. However, it could just as 
well be argued that the extra element makes the tort narrower than the 
statutory claim, i.e., that the UADA covers all sexual harassment, whether or 
not it is inflicted in a particularly egregious manner. Furthermore, recent 
critical commentary suggests that sexual harassment on the job always 
constitutes an intentional infliction of emotional distress. W. Page Keeton 
et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 12, at 18 (Supp.1988). If 
sexual harassment is per se outrageous and intolerable, it is difficult to 
see how the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can survive 
the Davis test. As this example illustrates, the Davis test is not a model 
of predictability or exactitude. 
9__ FN8. Defendants have not argued that workers' compensation is the 
exclusive remedy for Retherford1s claims of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligent employment. However, we realize that the 
preceding discussion may raise questions about the application of the 
Workers' Compensation Act to the present case on remand. Therefore, we take 
this opportunity to clarify some potential areas of confusion. See Utah 
R.App.P. 30(a); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991); Reeves v. 
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 119 (Utah 1991); Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 
1026 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Regarding Retherford's claim against her fellow employees for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, we have long held that an employee injured 
by the intentional tort of a fellow employee may sue the fellow employee 
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personally. See Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1975). 
Therefore, the Workers' Compensation Act poses no bar to Retherford1s suing 
her fellow employees for intentional torts. 
However, the Act's applicability to Retherford's claim against AT & T for 
negligent employment is less clear. We have yet to address directly whether 
a plaintiff who is mentally or physically injured by the intentional torts of 
a fellow employee can sue his or her employer for negligent employment or 
whether workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for the 
employer's negligence. Neither the Act itself nor judicial interpretations 
of it in Utah or elsewhere supply an explicit exception for the tort of 
negligent employment in such an instance. Our ruling in Mounteer, based as 
it is on an injury-oriented analysis rather than on an analysis centered on 
the legal theory of the claim, would suggest that workers' compensation would 
be an exclusive remedy. However, because the parties have neither raised nor 
briefed this issue, we decline to determine whether there is nonetheless some 
reason to allow the tort claim to go forward. In the event that this issue 
develops on remand, we do note that if Mounteer does not govern and workers' 
compensation does not supply an exclusive remedy, our previous case law may 
provide some guidance in determining AT & T's liability for Bateson-Hough's 
alleged intentionally tortious conduct. We have already determined that a 
managerial employee's tortious intent can be imputed to his or her employer 
under certain circumstances. See Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 
157 (Utah 1991) . 
. In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear and 
substantial" to support a cause of action for discharge in violation of 
public policy, one must examine the strength of the policy as well as the 
extent to which it affects the public as a whole. The very words "clear and 
substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As the majority of 
this court recognized in Peterson, all statements made in a statute are not 
expressions of public policy. Many statutes merely regulate conduct between 
private individuals or " 'impose requirements whose fulfillment does not 
implicate fundamental public policy concerns.' " Id. at 1282 (quoting Foley 
v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 217, 765 P.2d 
373, 379 (1988)) . 
The following questions are relevant to determining whether a statute 
embodies a clear and substantial public policy. First, one must ask whether 
the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public, as 
opposed to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether the public 
interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we should 
place the policy beyond the reach of contract, thereby constituting a bar to 
discharge that parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal 
oargaining power. Since these are the consequences of qualifying a policy as 
a basis for the tort action, these considerations should inform the 
evaluation of the policy itself. See id. at 1288 (Zimmerman, J., concurring 
and dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.); see also Foley, 765 P.2d at 379-80 & 
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n. 12. 
10. The UADA defines retaliatory conduct as follows: 
"Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action by an employer ... against one 
of its employees ... because he [or she] has opposed any employment practice 
prohibited under this chapter or because he [or she] has filed charges, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any way in any proceeding, 
investigation, or hearing under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15). 
79 FN11. As discussed more fully above, the UADA does not preempt 
Retherford's cause of action for breach of implied contract because none of 
the indispensable elements of this claim implicates an injury targeted by the 
UADA. However, even if there were an overlap between the indispensable 
elements of the contract claim and the injury addressed by the statute, that 
overlap would not dispose of the question of preemption. When dealing with 
the realm of contracts, we must add another step to our preemption analysis. 
First, we must examine, as we do with all common law causes of action, 
whether the statute at issue supplies an indispensable element of the breach 
of contract claim. If not, our analysis is at an end. If so, we must 
proceed to the second step, applicable only to contract claims. This step is 
premised on the unique nature of contracts. Tort law embodies statements of 
public policy, and therefore it is appropriate for a statutory policy to 
preempt a judicially declared policy. Contracts, by contrast, involve 
voluntary private agreements that our society endows with the force of law. 
Before we can interfere with the enforcement of this private agreement, we 
must find that the private agreement offends the public policy embodied in 
the statute, offends it so severely that it requires striking the term or 
clause as unenforceable. Consequently, the second step for determining 
preemption of a contract claim is whether public policy forbids parties to 
contract on such a subject, for such a remedy, or in such a manner. 
2. Retherford's complaint does not specify whether she is alleging 
interference with her collective bargaining agreement or with her contract 
implied from the code of conduct. Because the federal Labor Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), would preempt any claim that defendants 
interfered with Retherford's collective bargaining agreement, see Wilkes-
Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647 F.2d 
372, 377-78 (3d Cir.1981), we interpret her complaint as alleging 
interference with her implied contract of employment. 
3. Although Retherford stipulated to Gailey's dismissal upon Gailey's 
declaration of bankruptcy, Gailey's absence from this suit does not affect 
Retherford1s ability to prove Gailey's tortious conduct in order to find AT & 
T liable for negligent employment. It merely prevents Retherford from 
seeking damages from Gailey personally. Any finding that Gailey engaged in 
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tortious conduct would, of course, have no preclusive effect in a subsequent 
suit against Gailey herself. 
L4. Because Retherford claims only retaliatory harassment, not sexual 
harassment, we will not consider evidence of Gailey's unwelcome sexual 
advances. 
L5. Because the tort of negligent employment has received little explication 
in our cases, we take this opportunity to provide some background. The 
causes of action variously termed "negligent hiring," "negligent 
supervision," and "negligent retention" are all basically subsets of the 
general tort of negligent employment. See generally 53 Am.Jur.2d Master and 
Servant §§ 212, 422 (1970 & Supp.1992). These variants differ only in that 
they arise at different points in the employment relationship. By way of 
illustration only, we offer the following: a day-care provider who knowingly 
or negligently hires a convicted child molester might be liable for negligent 
hiring, see Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 
1221 (Alaska 1991), while a day-care provider who unwittingly hires a 
convicted child molester but retains him or her once his or her record and 
proclivities become apparent might risk liability for negligent retention. 
In both instances, once the day-care provider knows of the child molester's 
background, it might be liable for negligent supervision if it allows him or 
her unsupervised interaction with the children in its care. See generally 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958). 
6. As this case develops on remand, it may become apparent that the trial 
court may have to resort to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 
If this occurs, defendants are free to raise the question of preemption with 
the trial court, which should determine the issue. If the court finds 
section 301 preemption, the preempted portion of the claim must be dismissed. 
Today, we hold only that it is improper to find preemption on the basis of 
unsupported speculation as to how a case may evolve. 
7. For the guidance of the bench and bar, we make clear that while the 
standard for determining whether a plaintiff has experienced emotional 
distress is subjective, the standard for determining the outrageousness of 
the alleged conduct is objective. Consequently, a plaintiff claiming 
intentional infliction of emotional distress must show both that a reasonable 
person would consider the alleged conduct to be outrageous and that the 
plaintiff actually experienced subjective severe emotional anguish because of 
this objectively outrageous conduct. 
9_ FN18. We realize that not all cases will reveal so clearly the point at 
tfhich the plaintiffs actually experienced emotional distress. Although we do 
not at this time adopt their analysis, we note that courts facing similar 
difficulties in adjudicating Title VII claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, have 
enunciated a theory of continuing violation in order to allow plaintiffs to 
recover for patterns of employment discrimination. Like intentional 
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infliction of emotional distress, employment discrimination often manifests 
itself as a series of small wrongful acts instead of one dramatic injustice. 
Indeed, changing attitudes toward minorities and women in the work place may 
have contributed to the incidence of long-term patterns of employment 
discrimination because as social opprobrium of racial and sexual harassment 
has increased, people may have become more subtle in acting on or expressing 
their prejudices. While a defendant may be able to dismiss separate acts of 
subtle discrimination as merely coincidences or attempts at humor, an 
examination of these acts as a whole often will reveal their underlying 
pattern of malignity. To address these patterns, courts adjudicating Title 
VII claims allow recovery for an entire pattern of employment discrimination 
so long as one act of the continuing violation occurs within the statute of 
limitations period. See, e.g., Berry v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 
F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir.1983); Nelson v. Williams, 25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 
(BNA) 1214, 1215 (D.D.C.1981); Williams v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. , 
627 F.Supp. 752, 756-57 (W.D.Mo.1986); Tarvesian v. Carr Div. of TRW, Inc., 
407 F.Supp. 336, 339 (D.Mass.1976); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F.Supp. 1338, 1340 
(D.Haw.1974); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F.Supp. 891, 896 
(D.Me.1970); Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 810 
(Minn.Ct.App.1988). At least one state has adopted the Title VII continuing 
violation theory for causes of action brought under the state's 
antidiscrimination act, see Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 Mich. 
505, 398 N.W.2d 368, 380-81 (1986), and at least two states have codified the 
Title VII continuing violation theory in their administrative regulations 
governing employment, see Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights 
Commrn, 453 N.W.2d 512, 527 (Iowa 1990); Rock v. Massachusetts Commrn 
Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 424 N.E.2d 244, 248 & nn. 12-13 (1981) 
In determining the existence of a continuing violation, courts focus on the 
following factors, which are relevant to, but not dispositive of the 
existence of, a continuing violation: 
The first is subject matter. Do the alleged acts involve the same type of 
discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation? The 
second is frequency. Are the alleged act's recurring (e.g., a biweekly 
paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated work assignment or employment 
decision? The third factor, perhaps of most importance, is degree of 
permanence. Does the act have the degree of permanence which should trigger 
an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights, or which 
should indicate to the employee that the continued existence of the adverse 
consequences of the act is to be expected without being dependent on a 
continuing intent to discriminate? 
Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. 
9. Although Samms v. Eccles cites the second Restatement of Torts in support 
of this standard, see 11 Utah 2d 289, 293 n. 14, 358 P.2d 344, 347 n. 14 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Page 49 
4 P.2d 949, Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 
tah 1992) 
(1961), we note that Samms states a somewhat different threshold for 
outrageousness than does the Restatement. The Restatement requires that the 
conduct at issue be "extreme and outrageous," which it describes as "so 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency." Restatement ^Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d 
(1965). On the other hand, Samms holds that conduct is considered 
"outrageous and intolerable" if it offends against "the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality." 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347 
(emphasis added). 
We have reviewed Samms and our subsequent cases dealing with intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and have found no evidence whatsoever that 
the court intended to weaken the Restatementfs standard by this formulation. 
Cf. Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (citing both Samms 
and the Restatement without mentioning distinction). Moreover, although we 
recognize a theoretical difference between conduct that transgresses "all 
possible bounds of decency" and conduct that transgresses only "generally 
accepted standards of decency," we believe that in application, the 
distinction will be irrelevant, particularly in light of the Restatement's 
explanation that "[g]enerally, the case [of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress] is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average 
member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and 
lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' " Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, 
cmt. d (1965) (emphasis added). We retain Samms ' formulation of 
outrageousness to prevent any apprehension that we limit the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress to conduct that offends "all 
possible bounds of decency," an unrealistic and impossible standard. 
However, we stress that although our formulation differs slightly from the 
Restatement's, this difference is only a concession to the reality that no 
court would or could establish that certain conduct exceeds "all possible 
bounds of decency." We have in no way softened the Restatement's 
requirement of extraordinarily vile conduct, conduct that is "atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. 
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